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Abstract 
This present project is an investigation on how Libya’s head of state from 1969-2011, Muammar 
Gaddafi, was able to maintain political stability in an authoritarian regime that did not posses any 
form of democratic legitimacy. The theoretical framework is based upon Milan W. Slovik’s 
work on authoritarian regimes, Mabrouka al-Werfalli’s work on legitimacy and academic 
literature on neopatrimonialism from various authors.  
Gaddafi managed to put himself in a position where he prevented any serious threats from 
emerging against him by replacing and reshuffling people in influential positions, eliminating 
actual formal institutions and not allowing for any open opposition or civil society to emerge. He 
furthermore distanced himself from the governmental body by elevating his own position to that 
of the leader of the revolution. His role as a revolutionary leader and the charisma that 
surrounded him as a person created a sense of legitimacy behind the regime. Additionally he 
utilized the rents from Libya’s energy resources to provide the population with economic 
benefits and thus gained eudaemonic legitimacy. Moreover, the neopatrimonial mechanisms of 
Libya played an important role. When dealing with the broad population and the elite, Gaddafi, 
as the predominant patron of Libya, made use of both mass clientelism and elite clientelism by 
providing material advantages of different kinds and receiving a political support in return. These 
different ways of dealing with the population and the elite in order to maintain a stable society 
overlapped and intertwined, which is why they strengthened each others effect on Gaddafi’s way 
of sustaining stability in Libya. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In 2011 a wave of uprisings broke out in the Arab world that would eventually lead to some 
spectacular regime upheavals. Among those was the uprising in Libya that started in the eastern 
city of Benghazi, but soon spread to the rest of the country. With inspiration from the recent 
protests in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, a “day of rage” was planned on February 17th to 
demonstrate against the economic and political conditions. A well-known lawyer, that 
represented families from a prison massacre in 1996, had been arrested by the regime only two 
days prior to the planned protests.  The arrest had ignited rage among these families who then 
took to the streets to protest. When the “day of rage” arrived, the amount of protesters was 
already at around six thousand people, and even though the protesters were met with violent 
suppression from the regime, they quickly expanded in numbers with an articulated wish to 
overthrow the government (Gelvin 2012: 81).  
 
By the time of the uprising the infamous dictator Muammar Gaddafi1 had ruled Libya for 42 
years since he had lead a successful military coup in 1969. He had a vast amount of enemies 
internationally and was a very controversial personality, which made USA’s president Ronald 
Reagan characterize him as “the mad dog of the Middle East” (Gelvin 2012: 83).  
His personal impact on the Libyan society is not to be underestimated as he imposed an 
authoritarian regime ideologically rooted in his own “The Green Book” from the 1970’s. In “The 
Green Book” Gaddafi formed much of the foundation for how Libya was to be ruled politically 
in the years to come. With slogans like “representation is fraud” he dismissed the western 
parliamentary democracy (St. John 2008:162). This view on democracy was one of Gaddafi’s 
reasons to implement a system, which he called people’s authority or “mass-ocracy”. According 
to Gaddafi, this system was supposed to be a form of direct democracy where all citizens directly 
participate in the process of decision making and thereby exercise authority (al-Werfalli 2011: 
33). 
  
                                                
1 The name of Muammar Gaddafi can be spelled in numerous ways. We have chosen to use the spelling 
evident above and will use it during all of this project. In quotations the name will be spelled according to 
the author.  
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1.2. Theoretical introduction 
Our initial interest about Libyan politics undoubtedly originates from the extensive media 
coverage the country received in 2011, when the uprisings in the Arab region had the attention of 
the entire world. As we started doing our research for this project, our interest grew 
simultaneously, as we learned that the uprising in Libya, at the same time as being a part of a 
landmark of developmental change in the Arab world, also was a unique case with its very own 
particular history and political legacy behind it. Our original incentive and interest was primarily 
aimed at the political transition from an authoritarian dictatorship towards the construction of a 
new regime, assumingly based on democratic ideals. However, as we looked further into our 
empirical material, we realised that when you want to examine politics in Libya after the 
uprising, it is almost inevitable not to touch upon the Gaddafi regime. All struggles, challenges 
and advantages during and after the uprising in Libya led back to the structures, functions and 
composition of Libya under Gaddafi. In the 42 year long period where he was in power, his 
personality was important regarding everything that happened in the national political landscape 
that it can be difficult to distinguish between the politics of Libya as a political regime and the 
politics of Gaddafi as a person. For that reason, in this paper, when we write about how the 
regime operated politically, we equate that to the political ideas of Gaddafi unless something else 
is stated.  
 
Due to the discoveries above we moved our focus away from the uprising and its consequences 
and instead towards Gaddafi’s time of rule in Libya. The aspect that made us wonder the most 
was how Gaddafi had managed to stay in power for 42 years. Why did so many years pass 
without an uprising or a coup that posed an actual threat to the regime? How did Gaddafi manage 
to maintain this kind of stability? 
To investigate this, we place ourselves in a very broad field of research and analysis on the 
development of Middle Eastern states. Researchers in this field focus on a broad range of 
different aspects, from economics over human rights and culture to democratization and 
liberalisation aspects. Theorists focusing on rentierism in the Middle East among others cover 
the role of the elite in rentier states and how resources are distributed. Also, the relation to the 
political decision maker and its implications for resource distribution is emphasized (Schwarz 
2004). Others focus on the relation between economic liberalization and democratization, 
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emphasizing that sometimes a seemingly move towards democracy might only be cosmetic and 
function as a democratic facade (Ottoway 2008; Schlumberger 2000). These approaches affirmed 
the relevance of our interest in how, and due to which mechanisms or patterns, a regime can 
maintain stability in spite of a lack of democracy. On these grounds, we decided on three 
theoretical approaches regarding authoritarian regimes, legitimacy and neopatrimonialism, 
respectively. These will shed light on the structure of the Libyan authoritarian regime and its way 
of dealing with the elites and the population, on different ways of legitimizing a non-democratic 
rule and the consequences thereof, and also on neopatrimonial mechanisms in Gaddafi’s Libya. 
All three can provide a different angle on how to deal with the population and the elite and 
thereby maintain stability in an authoritarian society. They have been chosen as main approaches 
due to their relevance in the larger field of research. This will be elaborated further in the section 
on theoretical framework (4.1.). 
 
The theoretical considerations stated above have led us to the following research question: 
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2. Research question 
How was Gaddafi able to maintain political stability in an authoritarian regime that did not 
posses any form of democratic legitimacy? 
 
2.1. Clarification of research question 
In this section we seek to clarify our understanding of the central terms in the research question 
in order to prevent misunderstandings and obscurity in our further work with this project. 
Political stability is a key term and topic in our investigation of Gaddafi’s regime. During the 
project political stability will be considered as a state in society where no uprising or coup, 
which could have posed an actual threat to the rule of the current regime, has found place. 
Consequently we consider Gaddafi to have maintained political stability in his 42 years of rule 
until the uprising in 2011, as no oppositional movements before that had the ability to genuinely 
threaten his regime. 
The research question implies that we consider Gaddafi’s regime to have been an authoritarian 
regime. This is based on the definition by Svolik, who states that every political regime that does 
not meet the requirements of democracy is an authoritarian regime. Given that no competitive 
elections, or party system for that matter, existed during Gaddafi’s time of rule, we define 
Gaddafi’s regime as one of an authoritarian kind. This is at the same time an explanation of our 
use of the term democratic legitimacy in the research question, as Gaddafi’s regime, due to the 
mentioned characteristics, cannot be defined as a democratic regime. Even though democratic 
legitimacy will not be elaborated further in the project, we make use of the term in our research 
question to distinguish our work from this type of legitimacy and make room for analysing other 
ways and attempts of legitimizing an autocratic regime.  
The term legitimacy in general is used in different ways in our analysis of how Gaddafi 
maintained stability in Libya. Primarily, we use it with point of departure in al-Werfalli’s 
definition of legitimacy as being the recognition of the right to rule (al-Werfalli 2011: 11). This 
understanding is not based on any democratic requirements as we consider all kinds of support 
among both the elite and the population as a being a type of support that can create a recognition 
of the system and the regime’s right to rule. 
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2.2. Delimitation 
In this section we reason how and why we have had to delimit ourselves from certain areas of 
interest in our study of stability in Libya under Gaddafi.  
Even though our main focus is on the ways in which Gaddafi attempted to create stability in 
Libya, we will to some degree inevitably touch upon how and why this was difficult in certain 
periods of his reign. Thus, we will not be able to completely delimitate our work from reasons 
for the uprising in 2011.  
Furthermore, though violence and the threat of violence constitute a large part of an authoritarian 
regime and its methods of repressing the population, we will not elaborate Gaddafi’s use of 
violence towards the population. However, by investigating the role of the Revolutionary 
Committees and their way of watching over the population we will touch upon a different way of 
controlling the population.  
Lastly, we partly delimit our investigation of Gaddafi’s Libya from international conditions and 
relations. Though, it is not possible, and would be very limiting, to ignore international relations 
completely, as both economic and political circumstances in the rest of the world undeniably 
have influenced the politics of Gaddafi. An example of these circumstances could be Gaddafi’s 
inspiration by Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser or the oil crisis in 1979 that had global consequences 
for the market of natural resources. 
 
2.3. Operationalisation of research question 
This section will provide an outline of how we will approach the above stated research question. 
To answer our research question we will start with a theoretical chapter which firstly will 
elaborate our theoretical framework and thereafter will provide an elaboration of the three main 
theoretical approaches on authoritarian regimes, legitimacy and neopatrimonialism, respectively. 
The analysis will start with a short section providing background knowledge of state structures 
and conditions in Libya under Gaddafi, which is provided by our empirical material. 
Subsequently, we will divide the analysis into three separate parts. We have chosen to put 
forward three clarifying questions in order to answer the research question as structured as 
possible. Each of these questions will function as the base of one part of the analysis and is 
phrased based on the related theory.  
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The clarifying questions and their purpose run as follows: 
 
How did Gaddafi balance between the threat from the masses and the threat from the elite in 
order to stay in power? 
The purpose of this question is to investigate how Gaddafi managed the area of tension between 
the threat to his position of power by the Libyan population on one hand and from the elite on 
the other hand. It will be based on the work on authoritarian regimes by Milan Svolik in 
interaction with the empirical material presented in the chapter on methodology. We consider 
this part of the analysis as central due to the fact that it will shed light on the role and challenges 
of the authoritarian leader in maintaining his position and thereby political stability in a country 
and the ways in which this is conducted. 
 
Which ways of creating a sense of legitimacy can be identified in Gaddafi’s manner of securing 
his right to rule? 
In answering this question we will take point of departure in al-Werfalli’s work on legitimacy 
combined with both her own empirical work and material from the other empirical sources 
presented in the methodology chapter. The purpose of this section is to investigate which of the 
methods of creating legitimacy mentioned by al-Werfalli can be identified in Gaddafi’s rule and 
to investigate his ways of dealing with the population and how these functioned to keep Gaddafi 
in power. The answering of this question is essential for the ability to answer the research 
question, as it illustrates how Gaddafi created a sense of legitimacy in spite of the lack of actual 
democratic legitimacy and how this contributed to some degree of political stability even though 
parts of the population could be considered as alienated from the system. 
 
Which neopatrimonial mechanisms can be identified in Gaddafi’s regime? 
This part of the analysis will revolve around the theoretical material on neopatrimonialism 
outlined in the chapter on theory. With point of departure in our empirical material, we will seek 
to identify neopatrimonial mechanisms such as elite and mass clientelism and paternalistic 
rhetoric in Gaddafi’s way of dealing with the Libyan elite and population in general. The 
importance of this question for the final answering of our research question is clear, as it will 
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illuminate how clientelism, both in relation to the population and the elite, can contribute to 
maintaining a stable society.  
 
Following the analysis, we will move on to the discussion of the three parts of the analysis. The 
discussion will compare these different angles on Gaddafi’s relation to the elite and the 
population and discuss whether they might have weakened or strengthened each others effects on 
creating stability in Libya.  
 
The final conclusion of this project will sum up the results of the analysis and discussion and 
hereby provide an answer to our research question. 
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3. Methodology 
The chapter on methodology will provide an insight into our methodological considerations on 
both the empirical and theoretical material and our use of it. 
 
3.1. Presentation of empirical material 
This section clarifies which limitations we faced in finding empirical material and how the 
material used in this study was chosen. Furthermore, strengths and possible weaknesses in our 
main material are elaborated and supplementing empirical articles and books are presented. 
To be able to analyse in which ways Gaddafi created stability in Libya during his rule, we have 
read academical empirical literature that is applicable with, and relevant towards, our research 
question. The authoritarian feature of Gaddafi’s regime was embedded throughout all levels of 
society including the universities, where censorship and intolerance towards opposition have 
prevented critical research on the regime to be carried out for many Libyan domestic scholars. 
The authoritarian rule has also entailed a lack of transparency and free media which made it 
inconvenient for the said scholars to conduct profound research on politics in Libya. Therefore 
we have chosen the best fitting sources that have been available to us, even though there has not 
been a plethora of up-to-date critical material available in English.    
Specific limits on time and resources have made us realize that our analysis could have 
benefitted from a broader use of empirical data, to back up our claims and arguments. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the different academical research that we utilize throughout the 
project have the adequate magnitude to constitute a good basis for further analysis.  
 
During the project we make great use of the work of Dr. Mabrouka al-Werfalli in her 2011 book 
Political alienation in Libya. At the publishing time of the book al-Werfalli was a lecturer at the 
Department of Political Sciences at Libya’s Garyounis University.  Al-Werfalli conducted 
comprehensive research on Libyan political, social and economic conditions and the population’s 
attitudes towards the Gaddafi regime, which was started in 2001 and finished in 2008.  
We distinguish between al-Werfalli’s theoretical terms about legitimacy, which we use as a tool 
for further analysis, and her empirical work based on her own research. We are aware of a 
potential bias that this distinction might cause, especially when using her empirical material in 
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relation to her theoretical ideas. Nevertheless, we consider her empirical work to be applicable 
and of high quality and depth. This is especially the case as her empirical findings, in this 
project, are supplemented by other empirical material with academic weight.    
 
The book Libya: From Colony To Revolution is written by Ronald Bruce St John who is one of 
the world’s leading scholars on Libya and Middle Eastern studies. He has a Ph.D. in 
International Relations, has served on the International Advisory Board of the Journal of Libyan 
Studies and The Atlantic Council Working Group on Libya and has written several books on 
Libya. We make use of his profound research on Libya, which covers all periods of Gaddafi’s 
rule, highlighting perspectives from both the population and the regime. 
 
The empirical material by St John and al-Werfalli i supplemented by the following books and 
articles. 
James L. Gelvin is a Middle Eastern History professor at the University of California. His book 
The Arab Uprisings has given us a very useful perspective of the uniqueness of Libya, as he 
takes on a comparative approach in his study of the Middle Eastern region. He emphasizes the 
importance of understanding Gaddafi’s regime before one can start to even grasp on the 
character of the uprising or the country’s future.  
 
Throughout the analysis we complement our main empirical sources with the academical articles 
Libya’s Post-Qaddafi Transition: The Nation-building Challenge and The End of the Libyan 
Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition to strengthen our background knowledge and analytical 
points and particularly in the section on further perspectives, to elaborate on the transitional 
Libya and what challenges lie ahead in the near future.  
In a similar manner we have utilized a chapter in the Danish book Arabisk Forår Baggrund og 
Konsekvenser as a useful source.  
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3.2. Theoretical reasoning 
In this section we will elaborate the reasons for choosing our main three theoretical approaches 
and clarify how they will be applied to the case of Libya. Additionally, we will touch upon their 
possible strengths, weaknesses and contradictions and elaborate why we consider these 
approaches relevant for our project after all. 
During the process of writing this present project we obviously have narrowed down our 
theoretical approach so it fit our field of interest as much as possible. This is necessary to be able 
to construct a more focused analysis but it also has something to do with the finite time and 
space limits upon which the project is framed.  
As our main theoretical approaches for this project we have chosen to base our analysis on 
theories about authoritarian regimes, legitimacy in authoritarian societies and neopatrimonialism 
respectively. As partly illustrated in the introduction (1.2.) and further elaborated in the section 
on our theoretical framework (4.1.), these approaches are pertinent to our study of stability in 
Gaddafi’s regime, as they are related to and placed in a relevant field of research on authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
Milan W. Svolik’s book Politics of Authoritarian Rule showcases a comprehensive study about 
authoritarian regimes, how they function and why dictators work and behave in certain ways in 
different contexts. He highlights what he believes are the main two conflicts in an authoritarian 
regimes; the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and between the ruler and the ruling 
elites whom he rules with. Thus he primarily focuses on  the role of the dictator and 
predominantly takes on a  top-down approach on his analysis of authoritarian regimes. Svolik 
bases his work on case studies of different historical dictatorships and complements them with 
statistical data from all dictatorships that have existed in the period from 1946-2008. By 
comparing all of his data he composes a range of different reasons and explanations of why, how 
and when a dictator is behaving, and to some extent should behave, in a certain way. He certainly 
uses generalizations, but he also emphasizes that dictatorships can vary greatly and that “...each 
dictatorship may be undemocratic in its own way” (Svolik 2012: 20). For instance his 
generalizations come to display in his different kinds of typologies of dictatorships, but at the 
same time he warns of using these typologies universally. 
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In our project we use Svolik to characterize what kind of authoritarian regime Gaddafi ruled and 
to explain how Gaddafi, viewed from the regime’s perspective, maintained power. Svolik 
himself emphasizes that one should be very cautious about following his and others’ theoretical 
assumptions as causalities, and we have sought to be aware hereof during our own analysis. 
Svolik’s focus is mostly on how a regime’s power is manifested rather than how that power is 
experienced among the population. He does write about dictatorships inherited conflict with the 
ruled masses, but his main perspective is that of the dictator and the regime. For that reason we 
have chosen to complement our analysis with Mabrouka Al-Werfalli’s take on different forms of 
legitimacy. 
 
In her 2011 book called Political Alienation in Libya Mabrouka Al-Werfalli publishes her 
research about politics in Libya under Gaddafi. Contrary to Svolik a lot of her research revolves 
around the experience of the population within the dictatorship and thus helps us to further 
extend our horizon on how Gaddafi’s regime worked. It is important to note that Al-Werfalli’s 
book is written about Libya as a case study and she has made her research in Libya as well, but 
she also has elaborate theoretical assumptions that we make use of in our analysis. We thus make 
a distinction between her theoretical notions, which we use as a tool for further analysis, and her 
research, which we use to complement the other sources of literature about Libya.  
Her theoretical assumptions are obviously framed from a Libyan context, which we consider to 
be both beneficial and critical at the same time. Beneficial because she operates within an 
authoritarian framework, but critical because of the risk of us taking her conclusions for granted. 
Al-Werfalli’s central thesis is that stability does not necessarily equal a high level of legitimacy, 
and she goes on by identifying different forms of legitimacy. The inspiration from Max Weber’s 
classic types of legitimacy is evident, but she also mentions other additional types of legitimacy 
like negative, revolutionary and eudaemonic legitimacy that may be fitting for the type of 
authoritarian regime that Gaddafi controlled.  
Her distinction between legitimacy and stability can seem a little ambiguous since she  states that 
stability does not equal legitimacy, and that “...a regime’s legitimacy is affirmed by the 
participation of the citizen” (Al-Werfalli 2011: preface, xv). At the same time she comes up with 
different kinds of legitimacy, that are not based on participation. These statements seem 
contradictory, since it would not make sense to discuss legitimacy in an authoritarian Libyan 
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context, as is it is the case in al-Werfalli’s book, if participation is a requirement for legitimacy 
and if the existence of stability not necessarily is viewed as an indicator for legitimacy. This 
seemingly contradictory and ambiguous relation is not further clarified in her work.  
However, as mentioned in the clarification of our research question, in this project we do not use 
al-Werfalli’s work of legitimacy in a context of democratic legitimacy but rather to investigate 
other ways of creating a sense of legitimacy and support, even though this, naturally, will not 
refer to popular support and the like.  Thus, we consider her different forms of legitimacy to be 
relevant in an authoritarian context. 
As our own research has taught us, political support in Libya is very much linked up with patron-
client relationships and neopatrimonialism, which is why we have chosen to focus on that as a 
theoretical approach as well. Al-Werfalli discusses the term of eudaemonic legitimacy, but does 
not link it together with an explicit discussion of neopatrimonialism and patron-client relations in 
general. Nonetheless, this link demands our attention, both due to the relevance in relation to 
eudaemonic legitimacy and due to its relevance in the larger field of research as argued in the 
section on theoretical framework (4.1.).  
 
The 2012 book “Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond”, edited by Daniel C. Bach and 
Mamoudou Gazibo, constitutes the main foundation of our literature on neopatrimonialism. It 
includes chapters by several different authors, who base their work on a range of different 
theorists - from the original types of domination by Weber to modern interpretations and further 
work on this topic by Nicolas van de Walle, Shmuel Eisenstadt and Jean-Francois Medard. This 
was supplemented with clarifications of the basic terms from “Politics in the developing world” 
by Burnell et.al. and also Nicolas van de Walle’s and Michael Bratton’s original work on 
neopatrimonialism in Africa from the 1997 book “Democratic experiments in Africa - regime 
transitions in comparative perspective”. This literature elaborates the relation between the ruler 
and the population, which al-Werfalli shortly touches upon but does not clarify further. They 
investigate how the providing of material rewards affects this relationship, for instance when 
...particular individuals or groups that target transfers taken from private resources or public 
funds to other individuals or groups in order to buy their support” (Sindzingre 2012: 97). 
Furthermore the role of the neopatrimonial leader and his ways of securing support and also the 
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general overlap of the public and the private in neopatrimonial regimes are among the topics that 
are investigated.  
In our project we use the theory on neopatrimonialism to analyse Gaddafi’s relations to his ruling 
elite as well as to the population. Knowledge on neopatrimonialism may help to further 
understand the so-called eudaemonic legitimacy discussed by al-Werfalli and to apply it to the 
Libyan case. It will also contribute to an analysis of how Gaddafi’s regime may have generated 
support among the population by offering rewards, how this is linked to attempts of legitimizing 
the regime and how his ways of ruling Libya were related to the institutions. 
 
This section has provided an outline of which theories were chosen for this study, reasons for 
choosing them and their potential weaknesses.  
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4. Theory 
This chapter will give an insight into theoretical aspects used in this project. 
It is divided into four sections, of which the first section will give an overview of the theoretical 
framework this study is placed within. Each of the three following sections will focus on one of 
the chosen theoretical approaches and its content. 
 
 
4.1. Theoretical framework 
This section seeks to give an overview of part of the theoretical framework this study is placed 
within. Naturally, the field is much broader than this section can cover. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical approaches that will be introduced in this section have inspired us and have 
functioned as tools to, narrow down our area of focus and have assured us of the relevance of the 
three main theoretical approaches and their applicability for our purpose.  
 
A very recurring theme discussed by scholars when examining politics in the Middle East is the 
concept of rentierism or the rentier state. Rolf Schwarz has written an article about rentier states 
in the Middle East, where he argues that the nature of the rentier states decreases the incentive of 
the rulers to create a symbiosis between them and the population, as its main income is based on 
natural resources rather than taxation (Schwarz 2004: 24). Furthermore he argues that it is not 
meaningful to analyze the state formation in the Middle Eastern states in the same way as it has 
classically been done with western European states, because of how rent seeking eliminates the 
state’s need to extract money from it’s population via taxation. According to Schwarz there is 
clear empirical evidence that suggests that rentierism contributes to the discouragement of 
democratization and that the Middle Eastern states’ oil revenue is associated with 
authoritarianism (Schwarz 2004: 15-16).  
Schwarz also points out the socio-political aspect of Middle Eastern politics and how clientelism 
and tribalism have created loyalty towards something else than the state, when he argues that it is 
not labour or personal capacity but the connection to the decision maker that decides how 
resources are allocated (Schwarz 2004: 18). 
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Another subject, which is often discussed in a Middle Eastern context, is democratization which 
also is closely linked to the concept of rentier states. 
Both Marina Ottaway and Oliver Schlumberger have written about democratization in the 
Middle East, both of them before the big uprisings in the Arab world and thus when Gaddafi was 
still in power.  
Ottaway criticizes a common approach where democratization is seen as a three-phase process, 
first by liberalization followed by a transitional period with competitive multiparty elections 
ideally ending with the gradual consolidation of democracy. She states that many countries may 
experience liberalization and hold competitive elections, but the outcome is not truly democratic, 
it is rather a facade of democracy. She emphasizes that there is no universal pattern for 
democratization and that a successful transition must include a paradigm shift where the old 
assumptions of how the entire polity is organized are changed (Ottaway 2008:7).  
Schlumberger on the other hand seems to be more positive towards the notion of a three-phase 
process towards democracy and mentions how most Middle Eastern countries, not including 
Libya, experienced political liberalization to some extent during the 1980’s and 1990’s 
(Schlumberger 2000: 111). Liberalization does not lead causally to democratization, and he 
agrees with Ottaway as much as he states that by the end of the millenium, with the exception of 
Algeria, no Arab regime had allowed political liberalization to move towards democratization 
(Schlumberger 2000: 117). 
  
Schwarz’ point about rentier states’ association with authoritarian rule and how clientelism has 
affected the role of the state are closely related to theory on authoritarian regimes and theory on 
neopatrimonialism respectively. Generally, the link between rentier states and both the theory on 
authoritarian regimes and neopatrimonialism is evident when Schwarz states that the existence of 
external rents has created an elite that controls the resources with their own interest in mind 
(Schwarz 2004: 25). This is clearly related to both authoritarian regimes, which are ruled by an 
elite that rules based on its own interest, and to neopatrimonial structures as these can be centred 
around an elite or a patron distributing resources to the clients. 
Likewise Ottaway and Schlumberger’s observations of democratization and the lack thereof in 
the Middle East are associated with the theory on different forms of legitimacy in societies that 
are not based on democratic ideals. Ottaway mentions the creation of a facade democracy, which 
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relates to the aspect of participation and legitimacy. In the section on legitimacy theory we 
elaborate how the means of participation do not equal the existence of legitimacy as they might 
only exist formally and thereby contribute to create a facade of democracy. Additionally the 
theory of legitimacy can illustrate other ways of legitimizing a rule if not through democracy.  
 
In this way the work of the mentioned theorists has helped us determine our main theoretical 
approaches and assured us of their relevance for our study of stability in Gaddafi’s regime. 
This section has illustrated parts of the broad theoretical frame of research and analysis we are 
working within. The next three sections of this chapter will account for the content of our main 
theoretical approaches. 
 
 
4.2. Main theoretical approaches 
4.2.1. Authoritarian regimes 
Milan Svolik is an assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois and has 
specialized in authoritarian politics and democratic transitions. In his 2012 book The Politics of 
Authoritarian Rule Svolik argues that all dictatorships in order to remain in power have to deal 
with two fundamental conflicts that shape authoritarian politics. The first is what he refers to as 
authoritarian control, which is the threat from the masses that are being ruled, and the other is 
the threat from the elites in the society with whom dictators rule, referred to as the problem of 
authoritarian power-sharing (Svolik 2012: 2). The book showcases a comprehensive study of all 
the different authoritarian regimes that have existed in the period from 1946-2008 and states 
theoretical assumptions about dictatorships.  
 
According to Svolik a dictatorship is defined as every political regime that does not meet the 
requirements of a democracy and thus fails to elect their legislature and the executive in free and 
fair elections (Svolik 2012: 20). Dictatorships can vary greatly and should never be considered as 
a unilateral category, but they have an undemocratic structure as a common indicator.  
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Svolik refers to the Babara Geddes’ typologies of authoritarian regimes as the most commonly 
used in the recent research on the topic. Geddes distinguish between 3 ideal types of 
dictatorships: 
- Personalist dictatorships that revolve around the central leader. 
- Military dictatorships that place the power in the hands of professional soldiers.  
- Single-party dictatorship that is established and governed through a single authoritarian 
political party (Svolik 2012: 29) 
The 3 types of regimes can be useful tools used for further analysis, but Svolik emphasizes that 
the three types should not be seen as sufficient typologies that fit universally (which according to 
Svolik is a typical misinterpretation of Geddes). The main reason is that they are not mutually 
exclusive or collectively exhaustive (Svolik 2012: 38). It is thus possible for regimes to be 
characterized as overlapping between the different categories. For instance it could be argued 
that the Syrian regime from 1970 to 2000 included all three typologies.  
In relation to attempts of classifying regimes Svolik excludes periods of foreign intervention, 
state collapse or civil war from his data, since such periods are best characterized by their lack of 
any sovereign political authority and are thus neither democratic or authoritarian (Svolik 2012: 
25).  
 
In any given authoritarian regime the dictator has to rely on the support of elite allies to help him 
rule efficiently. The need for support shapes the paradoxical essence of power sharing in non-
democratic regimes. The dictator’s desire to acquire more power to himself conflicts with his 
need of support to secure his position (Svolik 2012: 54). At one hand the allies should always be 
somewhat worried about giving too much power to the dictator that he can use to eliminate their 
influence, on the other hand the dictators’ actions are constrained by the allies´ threat of 
replacing him. Such a threat only works as a deterrent if it has credibility behind it (Svolik 2012: 
58). A threat to replace a dictator always possesses the risk of a failed rebellion with 
considerable consequences.  
Svolik distinguishes between contested autocracies and established autocracies. In contested 
autocracies, the dictator rules with an underlying threat that the ruling coalition might overthrow 
him, albeit him still being the most powerful person. He is forced to share the power to ensure 
his own position. Contrary in established autocracies, the dictator has consolidated enough power 
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so that the ruling coalition does not possess a credible threat (Svolik 2012: 61). A transition from 
a contested autocracy into an established autocracy is possible, but the other way around is really 
unusual. Thus the established autocracies constitute a point of no return, where the established 
dictators don’t lose power to their allies but rather due to the occurrence of a popular uprising or 
by foreign intervention (Svolik 2012: 63). The longer a dictator is in office the more likely is it 
that he is an established autocrat rather than contested. The Empirical data on dictatorships from 
1946-2008 also clearly indicates that most coup d’états occur within the first few years of a 
dictators ruling period (Svolik 2012: 75-77).  
 
Established autocrats will ensure their own position by never allowing anyone in their ruling 
coalition to become too powerful. They do so by enforcing rotations and dismissals among the 
powerful positions in the state or the military, where there might be a potential threat against 
them. If an administrator is becoming too powerful, a dismissal is likely to be accompanied by 
public humiliations to strip him for any credibility he might have possessed. The purpose is to 
publically signal the dictators’ independence from any of his administrators and also to state that 
no one besides the dictator himself is irreplaceable. In established autocracies the dictators’ 
outward appearance of being invincible is as important of his actual power (Svolik 2012: 80).  
In rare situations where the dictator controls a very large share of power, he might not even be in 
need of any direct allies to survive in office because no body possesses a credible threat to him. 
Svolik puts it this way: “…the dictator’s own power prevents him from credibly committing to 
sharing it; the severity of his allies’ collective-action problem undermines their threat to replace 
him. In this case, even institutions cannot alleviate that commitment problem” (Svolik 2012: 99). 
 
Authoritarian regimes vary greatly in terms of to what degree they have been institutionalized. 
Some dictators rule through formal institutions while others do everything they can to prevent 
institutionalization of the country because it might change the power relations away from the 
dictator himself.  
According to Svolik formal institutions, if implemented at the very power centre of dictatorships, 
might help to mitigate the gruesome characters of some authoritarian rulers. The reason is that 
deliberative and decision-making institutions can push for better transparency between the 
dictator and his allies in the regime, which might prevent unnecessary confrontations. Formal 
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institutionalized rules might assure the allies that the dictator does not usurp too much power and 
can help to detect it if he does so (Svolik 2012: 87). 
Institutions thus have the potential to facilitate power sharing amongst the elite and can work as a 
stabilizing factor. But they only work if the share of power between the dictator and the allies is 
distributed relatively even. Tacit expectations and norms are not sufficient in securing against the 
dictators temptations of refusing to share power. Formally written down rules on the other hand 
can help to prevent ambiguity about when a dictators’ actions are considered to be violating 
(Svolik 2012: 94). But yet again the efficiency of such rules is bound to the distribution of power 
sharing: “…the dictator’s compliance with formal constraints on his power is self-enforcing only 
when backed by a credible threat of an allies’ rebellion” (Svolik 2012: 96).  
As an example of a dictator whose personal influence wasn’t constrained by institutional rules 
Svolik gives the example of Mao Zedong in China. Mao’s charismatic personality was so 
dominating that it overshadowed and neglected both institutional rules and any of his 
contemporaries. Besides his charisma the authority he possessed was also grounded in 
revolutionary achievements, which almost gave him a divine popular status as China’s 
undisputed leader (Svolik 2012: 100).  
 
A very central conflict with authoritarian power holding is how the rulers should deal with the 
fact that the vast majority of the population is completely excluded from power. The main ways 
of resolving this conflict are either by co-optation or repression. But with repression comes the 
paradox that the very same resources that are used to protect the regime against threats from 
opposing actors can be used against the regime as well (Svolik: 2012: 124). The role of the 
military outlines the key dilemma in dictatorships. The military can work as an efficient tool to 
suppress against an angry mob, but if the military is too well organized and equipped it might 
constitute a threat towards the regime itself.  
The reliance on repression might be risky for a regime, since the more indispensable the military 
gets in upholding suppression of any opposition, the greater their capacity to turn against the 
regime. The bigger role the soldiers play in protecting the regime, the more likely it is that they 
will demand influence, power and greater autonomy (Svolik 2012: 127). In regimes where the 
threat of an overthrowing from the masses is unlikely, the reliance on the military for repression 
is not as articulated. Smaller challenges are met by police forces or security services instead 
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(Svolik 2012: 131). The military is then deliberately kept ill equipped and less organized to make 
sure that it cannot threat the power of the regime. A scenario like that obviously makes the 
dictatorship more vulnerable to foreign intervention. If the country is rich in natural resources, a 
loyal and effective army is useful in remaining in control over them, both concerning domestic 
and foreign interventionists (Svolik 2012: 149). At the same time the example highlights the 
dilemma concerning military power, since control over natural resources can be a precondition 
for a dictator to remain in office in the first place.  
     
4.2.2. Legitimacy 
Al-Werfalli defines legitimacy as the recognition of a regime’s right to rule (al-Werfalli 2011: 
11). All regimes in general want to generate this recognition of their rule. One of the main 
questions in al-Werfalli’s investigation is how this recognition manifests itself – often this is said 
to be shown through support of the regime. However, al-Werfalli’s central thesis is that stability 
and lack of opposition not necessarily equal legitimacy. During the book, al-Werfalli touches on 
different reasons for and forms of political alienation that can be the cause for lacking 
involvement in politics and therefore also the lack of opposition. Additionally, she presents 
different kinds of legitimacy and types of support and its absence in an alienated population. 
While previous research on legitimacy in the Arab world mainly has been concentrated on 
“system level legitimacy” and not on the individual orientations of support among the 
population, al-Werfalli takes point of departure in the population’s recognition of the regime and 
types of support and recognition among the population. 
  
The three traditional types of legitimacy invented by Weber are the traditional, legal - rational 
and charismatic. However, Weber mostly refers to these as “types of domination”. The concept 
of legitimacy and the claim hereof are additional aspects. Weber uses them to distinguish the 
forms of domination, based on their specific claims to legitimacy. However, even though 
regarded as additional aspects, Weber still considers legitimacy in general as a necessary element 
in guaranteeing stability. (Bruhns 2012: 16) 
Considering al-Werfallis focus on the population it is interesting to note that Weber considers the 
most important relationship of domination to be between the ruler and his administrative staff, 
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while the relation between the ruling elite and the masses only is his secondary concern (Bruhns 
2012: 17). 
  
The one of Weber’s classic types of legitimacy that is mentioned and further discussed in the 
book is charismatic legitimacy. Charisma in this context has many different definitions. Where 
Weber describes charisma as a personality that sets an individual apart from the rest and that is 
treated like being in possession of exceptional powers, other theorists define it as some form of 
inspirational leadership rather than the hypnotic leadership described by Weber (al-Werfalli 
2011: 23). However, charisma becomes insignificant if it is not socially acknowledged. 
Subsequently the citizen’s recognition is central to the identification of charismatic authority.  
This is linked with the fact that charisma is “…based on one individuals’ psychological 
identification with another” (al-Werfalli 2011: 25). Especially for individuals in societies, which 
are in the midst of a transition or other unstable periods, identification with a charismatic leader 
can provide some sort of stability. 
According to Weber, a pivotal problem in charismatic legitimacy is the importance of the 
regime’s, and especially the charismatic leader’s, performance and ability to live up to the 
promises made and being consistently successful (al-Werfalli 2011: 19). If this is not the case, 
followers of charismatic leaders often withdraw their support. 
A central point regarding eudaemonic and charismatic legitimacy is that they can help to create a 
sense of legitimacy, among others through providing economic benefits (al-Werfalli 2011: 11), 
which can contribute to generating acceptance of the ruler and his political rule and thereby 
stability. 
 
When it is not possible for a state to generate support and recognition of its right to rule – i.e. 
legitimacy - through traditional authority or legal-rational mentioned by Weber, it has to do so by 
using other methods. An example hereof is the eudaemonic legitimacy, which is also considered 
as a fourth type of legitimacy in addition to Weber’s classical types, and is based on the state 
providing social and economic benefits for its citizens (al-Werfalli 2011:  12). This is very often 
the most important way of creating support among the population in authoritarian regimes. By 
giving goods and services to the citizens, a regime like this expects the citizen’s belief of the 
regime being worthy of rule in return (al-Werfalli 2011: 19). The execution of this type of 
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legitimacy requires the state to be able to deliver the resources that generate the support in the 
population, or else the base of support vanishes. This makes a regime built on eudaemonic 
legitimacy vulnerable, as it is difficult for a country to guarantee continuing successful economic 
performance, which means that the regime will lack legitimacy among the population when 
facing economic crises (al-Werfalli 2011: 22). The strategy of “buying support”, which is 
observed in these types of regimes, is then difficult to fulfil. Focusing on eudaemonic legitimacy 
also entails the challenge that the bond between citizens and political life is not strengthened and 
civic membership, which is an important indicator for legitimacy, is therefore not created (al-
Werfalli 2011: 153). When the regime can no longer provide the mentioned benefits, its 
legitimacy therefore is in question, as it is neither created through providing benefits nor through 
existence of civic membership. 
 
Regimes that have obtained power through a revolution or the like are often, in the beginning of 
their rule, additionally legitimized by the lack of legitimacy of the former regime, which they 
seek to replace (al-Werfalli 2011: 14). This is called negative legitimacy. Negative legitimacy is 
undeniably linked to the so-called revolutionary legitimacy. Al-Werfalli states that: 
“Revolutionary legitimacy contradicts democracy, undermines other rational formulas of 
legitimacy and encourages rule through coercion, and because it involves coercion, 
revolutionary legitimacy cannot generate voluntary compliance.” (al-Werfalli 2011:33) 
Subsequently, it is said that this type of legitimacy is the last resort to go to if a regime lacks 
political support. However al-Werfalli also argues that the validity of claiming legitimacy this 
way will be questionable when a regimes relies on it for too long a period of time (al-Werfalli 
2011: 33) 
   
As mentioned in the above, support is an important indicator when measuring legitimacy and 
political support is said to be a necessary condition for legitimacy (al-Werfalli 2011: 49). The 
definition used in the book is support as a “… favourable orientation towards a person, group, 
idea or institution.” (al-Werfalli 2011: 49). When investigating the meaning of support, al-
Werfalli differs between diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support is defined as a kind of 
support that does not have to be bought by the system and is the kind of trust in the system that 
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will help citizens accept outputs which they would normally be dissatisfied with or even opposed 
to (al-Werfalli 2011: 60). Diffuse support consequently is a form of trust.  
Specific support on the other hand is generated through economic performance of the regime (al-
Werfalli 2011: 13). The term covers the creation of favourable attitudes towards the regime by 
creating outputs that continuously meet the citizens’ demands (al-Werfalli 2011: 45). In other 
words, specific support is created when the citizens are satisfied with the political system’s 
outputs and performance. When focusing only on a materialistic way of obtaining support, 
specific support is generated, while the base for the aforementioned long lasting diffuse support 
is not built. 
  
On a scale where loyalty with the system represented through political support is the positive 
end, political alienation constitutes the negative end of the scale. Alienation is considered a 
fundamental issue when measuring legitimacy (al-Werfalli 2011: 49). According to al-Werfalli 
“Political alienation implies a breakdown in the individual sense of attachment to the 
government.” (al-Werfalli 2011: 73). This means that individuals feel estranged towards the 
system and turn down the system as a whole.  Political alienation is said to be self-reinforcing as 
it creates an increasing degree of disconnection from the state. 
Reasons for and definitions of political alienation are various, but one of the main reasons for a 
feeling of estrangement towards the government often is dissatisfaction with a regime and its 
outputs over a long period of time. Also, a sense of inefficacy is often used as a definition for, or 
at least as an important factor in, the emergence of a state of alienation (al-Werfalli 2011: 105). 
Citizens’ feeling of inefficacy, meaning a sense of them not producing the outcome that they 
desired, generally emerges when the citizen regards that his influence on politics will never be 
effective or that he is not a part of the political system in general (al-Werfalli 2011: 105). Being 
inefficacious does not necessarily create a feeling of political alienation. However, when the 
citizen, in addition to feeling inefficacious, is also dissatisfied with current circumstances in the 
system, this is usually the case. A consequence of feeling inefficacious often is that these citizens 
are likely to not participate or show interest in politics. Citizens that feel they can actually 
influence the system, on the other hand, participate more and therefore may regard the policies to 
be more beneficial, which in the end can result in creating the above-mentioned diffuse support 
(al-Werfalli 2011: 106) 
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Additionally political alienation is sometimes regarded as powerlessness. This powerlessness is 
linked to a shortcoming in the channels through which citizens can influence politics. It appears 
when the citizens feel that their thoughts are considered irrelevant and that they are not able to 
influence the governments’ actions (al-Werfalli 2011: 109). Just as it is the case with citizens 
who feel inefficacious and therefore alienated, citizens are more likely to feel powerless if they 
are discontented with the current situation. The difference between feeling inefficacious and 
feeling powerless is that the latter occurs due to the political system, while the former is an 
individual perception. When a citizen feels powerless he is alienated because he lacks the means 
to influence politics (al-Werfalli 2011: 109).  
The above mentioned on inefficacy and powerlessness is underpinned by al-Werfalli’s following 
statement: “The existence of the means of participation does not always indicate the existence of 
legitimacy when a state of abstentionism proliferates since a regime’s legitimacy is affirmed by 
the political participation of the citizen” (al-Werfalli 2011: preface, xv). This illustrates how 
participation is related to legitimacy and how the means for participation does not equal actual 
participation by citizens. The terms inefficacy and powerlessness as leading to alienation clarify 
this, since they illustrate how citizens can feel that they have no influence and their political 
positions are irrelevant, even though the formal means of participation exist. 
According to al-Werfalli, a feeling of political alienation is linked to a certain political behaviour 
of the individual. The three behavioural orientations further elaborated by her are the 
revolutionist attitudes, reformist attitudes and the status quo supporters. While individuals with a 
revolutionist attitude support fundamental changes of the system, reformist individuals present 
an attitude of supporting some modifications to the system with some key elements remaining as 
they are. 
 
4.2.3. Neopatrimonialism 
The concept of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism has for many years been linked to the 
analysis of governance and construction of states in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The term 
neopatrimonialism derives of patrimonialism and emerged due to the fact that patrimonialism, as 
a tool for analysing modern states, was questioned by different theorists in the 1970s. Shmuel 
Eisenstadt in particular emphasised the importance of distinguishing between the traditional 
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patrimonial regimes and the more modern forms of patrimonialism which he argued had become 
more frequent. (Bruhns 2012: 9)  
Patrimonialism is defined as a state where all relations between the ruler and the ones that are 
ruled are private relations and a distinction between the private and the public is not existing. 
Originally it was a term used by Max Weber who concentrated parts of his work on investigating 
different types of domination. He identified, as mentioned in the previous section on legitimacy 
three types of legitimate domination (Bruhns 2012: 16). Traditional domination is one of those 
three types, and according to Weber, patrimonialism is a subcategory thereof (Gazibo 2012: 80). 
Weber argues that: “Patrimonialism...tends to arise whenever traditional domination develops 
an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master” 
(Bruhns 2012: 18). This illustrates the correlation between patrimonialism and traditional 
domination. 
As mentioned above, the distinction between patrimonialism and newer forms of de-
traditionalized patrimonialism, later neopatrimonialism, became increasingly important to 
different theorists. One of those was Guenther Roth, who had observed how tradition was no 
longer a source of legitimacy in many countries and that it had not been replaced by legal-
rational forms. Thus, Roth argued that: “..forms of personal rule that did not correspond to any 
of the three Weberian types of legitimacy...essentially owed their maintenance to material 
incentives and rewards, notably clientelism and corruption.” (Bruhns 2012: 10). The difference 
in these forms of domination stated in the citation was Roth’s reason for distinguishing between 
traditional patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. Generally the differences between the former 
and the latter were found in the relationship between the private and the public. Where 
relationships in patrimonialism, as mentioned, are purely private, relationships in 
neopatrimonialism are both public and private (Bruhns 20132: 10). A distinction between the 
private and the public sphere exists, at least formally, and neopatrimonialism can therefore be 
said to be a mixture of patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy. It is important to note that 
the addition of “neo” does not necessarily imply the link to a modern state as neopatrimonialism 
additionally does not seem to be linked to particular political regimes (Sindzingre 2012: 94). 
However, while patrimonialism mostly refers to traditional domination, neopatrimonialism 
borrows elements from traditional institutions, yet it is modern in the way that it may actually 
thrive in a modern society (Sindzingre 2012: 92). In neopatrimonialism there are overlaps 
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between the traditional and the modern, the public and the private, the political and the economic 
and so on. For example an overlap between the private and the public can be observed when 
individuals treat state resources as their own property (Sindzingre 2012: 92). Thus, a 
neopatrimonial state is both patrimonial and bureaucratic and the distinction between the 
mentioned areas is therefore evidently blurred. 
 
When investigating neopatrimonialism, patronage and patron-client relations are regarded as 
crucial to gain an insight into, as they constitute a central element of a neopatrimonial system. At 
their core, patron-client relations are uneven as they are based on an unequal power relation 
between the patron and the client. The client in this context lacks power and wealth, while the 
patron is powerful and has access to resources and opportunities that he can provide in exchange 
for the client’s support, loyalty or the like. Thus, the relation is certainly reciprocal, however, it 
remains unequal (Leftwich 2011: 232). A typical example of this relation between patron and 
client can be the following: “...particular individuals or groups that target transfers taken from 
private resources or public funds to other individuals or groups in order to buy their support” 
(Sindzingre 2012: 97). This is underpinned by the fact that the leader in neopatrimonial regimes 
maintains authority through patronage, like in the patron-client relation in the citation above, 
rather than through ideology or law (Bach 2012: 28). This is also apparent in the following 
citation: “The chief executive and his inner circle undermine the effectiveness of the nominally 
modern administration by using it for systematic patronage and clientelist practices in order to 
maintain political order” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62). Consequently in can be argued that 
the ruling elites’ attempts of consolidating their power may actually weaken an already fragile 
state even further. When discussing the leader in neopatrimonial regimes, Weber, mentions the 
so-called political entrepreneur. The political entrepreneur in his definition is a charismatic 
leader who is able to maintain support because of his ability to provide rewards (Compagnon 
2012: 47). Neopatrimonial leaders in general have often been likely to create a cult of their 
persona, which has led to the style of national politics becoming a reflection of the leader’s 
personality (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 64). Often the leader in this kind of regime assumes 
the role of the father figure of the nation, also called pater familias. This paternalistic rhetoric 
has in several neopatrimonial African states been said to be “...used to legitimate nondemocratic 
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authority” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 64) by creating an image of the ruler as a strict but fair 
father figure who is responsible for the welfare of his people.  
 
When contemplating the role of the leader in neopatrimonial regimes, it is important to consider 
the mentioned essence of neopatrimonialism, namely the coexistence of patrimonialism and 
bureaucracy, in relation to other state institutions. It is argued by Michael Bratton and Nicolas 
van de Walle that “...neopatrimonial regimes were typically highly exclusionary and the 
strongman tended to rule by decree; institutions of participation existed in name only and could 
not check the absolute powers of the chief executive” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 65). Many 
neopatrimonial states can therefore be said to be formally democratic, however, these democratic 
institutions might often only exist in theory. 
 
Instead of relying on these formally democratic institutions, neopatrimonial leaders, as 
mentioned, often rely on clientelism to remain in power: “Lacking political legitimacy, rulers 
survived through coercion and clientelism, but often failed to exercise complete control over the 
polity.” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 67). When using clientelism to remain in power it is 
defined as political clientelism which, not unlike the patron-client relations described earlier in 
this part, is an exchange relationship between unequals where the more powerful agent gets a 
political advantage while the less powerful agent gets a material one (van de Walle 2012: 113). It 
seems that clientelism is likely to exist in all modern states, however, it has been discovered that 
the reliance of clientelism is closely linked to the use of state resources for political legitimation 
(Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 66).  
In clientelism, three types have been identified; the traditional tribute, elite clientelism and mass 
clientelism. Elite clientelism in this understanding is limited to include a narrow political elite 
and is often associated with authoritarian states in possession of a limited capacity of resources. 
It is characterized for instance by the distribution of public offices to key personalities of the elite 
and by granting people in the elite access to state resources (van de Walle 2012: 113). The goal 
of elite clientelism therefore is to keep the leader and his political allies in the elite in power.  
In mass clientelism on the other hand, state resources are used to provide jobs and other services 
to a mass political clientele. Mass clientelism requires a relatively wealthy state to be able to 
provide this expensive degree of patronage and is considered consistent with an effective state 
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apparatus. Consequently, poor countries often limit clientelism to the ruling elites. Additionally 
it is argued that the less democratic the system is, the more likely it is that the benefits of 
clientelism will favor the elites, which is related to the fact that authoritarian regimes have a 
smaller need to be responsive to their citizens (van de Walle 2012: 117). 
It is important to remember that the distinction between elite and mass clientelism seldom is as 
clear as it has been illustrated above.  
The extent of clientelism performed in a state is, according to van de Walle, dependant on the 
wealth of the economy and the resources available to the state. 
However, it has been argued that elite clientelism is more important to secure political stability 
than the kind of political patronage seen in mass clientelism (van de Walle 2012: 114). 
An essential element in clientelism and patronage relations is corruption. Corruption includes, 
among others, actions such as bribery and vote buying. As explicitly stated above, the buying of 
support is central in patron-client relations which illustrates that corruption is a recurrent part of 
neopatrimonialism (Sindzingre 2012: 97). Capturing and sharing state resources is considered an 
effective way of maintaining clientelism. Roth underpins this by stating that: “Neopatrimonial 
domination...can be maintained for a certain time through support that has been secured. It can 
also generate new forms of support, but no belief in legitimacy.” (Bruhns 2012: 21). However, to 
have the ability to buy support by sharing state resources, institutionalization has to be weak and 
public officials have to be hired because of their loyalty and not due to qualification (Sindzingre 
2012: 103). If this is the case, elite clientelism will be able to endure. 
 
 
4.3. Strategy for analysis 
This section will provide an elaboration of and reasoning for our strategy for the analysis of this 
project.  
Firstly the analysis in this project will provide a section on background knowledge about Libya. 
The section will focus mainly on the state structures and conditions under Gaddafi’s rule, 
provided by our empirical material.  
Following this will be an analysis that is divided into three parts, which all three will provide 
different perspectives on how Gaddafi dealt with the elite and the population in general to 
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maintain his rule and stability in Libya. Each part is based on a clarifying question which we 
seek to answer in that part. The three questions will function as a common thread during the 
analysis. 
 
After a short background section on Libyan society under Gaddafi the first part of the analysis 
will seek to answer the first of the clarifying questions. Based on an interplay between our 
empirical material and Svolik’s theory we will analyse how the terms and processes described by 
Svolik can be applied to the context of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. We will investigate how 
Gaddafi handled the balance of power sharing on one hand and the need for support from the 
elites on the other hand. Furthermore, the section will present an analysis of how Gaddafi and his 
ruling elite dealt with the large part of the population that was not included in the political 
processes, which will include issues such as control and repression. Finally, the first section of 
the analysis will cover the formal institutions in Libya and Gaddafi’s relation to 
institutionalization and institutions in general. 
As evident from the above, the first part of the analysis has its main focus on the role of the 
authoritarian leader and his challenges in dealing with the population and his allies. It will not, or 
only in a small degree, shed light on the population’s role in authoritarian regimes.  
 
The second part of the analysis, and the question related to it, is based on the theoretical work on 
legitimacy by al-Werfalli. Combining the empirical material, both by al-Werfalli herself and by 
St. John,  and her theoretical material on legitimacy and political alienation, this section will 
provide an analysis of the ways in which Gaddafi attempted to legitimize his rule during the 42 
years he was in power. We will analyse both how Gaddafi made use of charismatic legitimacy 
and how he sought to legitimize his rule through eudaemonic legitimacy and the strategy of 
buying support. Also, we will investigate the role of negative and revolutionary legitimacy. 
Subsequently it will be investigated how specific and diffuse support was created among the 
Libyan population. Lastly, the section will contain an investigation of the consequences of the 
mentioned ways of legitimizing his rule for the relation of the Libyan population to Gaddafi’s 
political system. This will include terms such as political alienation, inefficacy, powerlessness 
and participation. 
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Consequently, the second section of the analysis will illustrate the role of the population and its 
perception of the authoritarian regime. This functions as a supplement to the first part of the 
analysis, as it sheds light on the other side of the challenges of an authoritarian regime, namely 
the population. 
 
The third and final clarifying question of the analysis will revolve around the theory on 
neopatrimonialism. By making use of this material in interplay with the empirical material, we 
will analyse which neopatrimonial mechanisms can be identified in Gaddafi’s regime. It will 
contain an analysis of which patronage mechanisms Gaddafi made use of to stay in power. 
Additionally, we will investigate in which ways Gaddafi can be identified as a political 
entrepreneur and father of the Libyan nation. Finally, we will analyse the role of formal 
institutions of participation and the role of clientelism under Gaddafi and in continuation thereof 
seek to identify whether and in which periods he made use of mass clientelism or elite 
clientelism. These mentioned neopatrimonial relations and mechanisms are a recurring thematic 
in both the kind of authoritarian regime we investigate and in the ways in which some 
authoritarian rulers legitimize their rule.  
Consequently all three theoretical approaches will shed light on different perspectives of the 
ways in which Gaddafi handled his relation to the population and the elite and thereby attempted 
to secure his rule. At the same time they intertwine on certain topics and areas which will result 
in a coherent analysis. This substantiates our choice of using three different theoretical 
approaches. 
 
Finally, this chapter will be followed up by a discussion of the three parts of the analysis. It will 
discuss the correlation of these different angles on Gaddafi’s ways of handling the relation to the 
elite and the population and compare whether they might have weakened or strengthened each 
other in creating stability in Libya 
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5. Analysis 
This chapter will firstly provide a background section of the Libyan state under Gaddafi. 
Following it will provide a three-part analysis, each with point of departure in one of the 
clarifying questions and thereby main theoretical approaches. Every part of the analysis will be 
completed with a related sub-conclusion.  
 
5.1. Background 
On the 1st of September 1969 a small group of approximately 70 officers from the Libyan army 
executed a successful coup d’état against the contemporary monarch, the aging King Idris. The 
group of officers called themselves the Free Unionist Officers’ Movement and were led by a 
twelve-man central committee entitled the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), whose de 
facto leader soon after the coup appeared to be colonel Muammar Gaddafi (St John 2012: 132). 
The overturned monarchy had taken over the power of government after Libya’s independence 
in 1951, following a period of Italian colonization and an interim period after the Second World 
War.  However, it did not meet the requirements of a new type of government that was 
increasingly in the rise in the Arab world at the time, especially spawned by the ideological 
thoughts of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser. Gaddafi and the other military officers 
on the other hand were highly inspired by Nasser’s call for the Arab nations to rise against the 
reactionary rulers and his advocating of pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism (Al-Werfalli 2011: 
14). 
 
Gaddafi quickly became the leader of the new revolutionary regime and consolidated his power 
in various ways. In the aftermath of a failed coup attempt in 1975 from officers within the RCC, 
Gaddafi and four of his closest allies appointed themselves as the elite leaders of the revolution. 
The failed coup thus functioned as a stepping stone towards the abolishment of the RCC and a 
one-man rule with Gaddafi as the undisputed leader of the nation (St John 2012: 165). 
The ideological foundation of the revolution was definitively expressed in Gaddafi’s Green Book 
with the conceptualization of Jamahiriya, the rule of the masses, through a form of direct 
democracy exercised in a system of people’s congresses in which the true voice of the people 
would be heard and passed on to the revolutionary leaders. He opposed representative democracy 
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and its institutions and discredited such a system as being fraudulent (Gelvin 2012: 71). This 
included the rejection of political parties, trade unions and independent media.    
The direct democracy was exercised through participation in the Basic Popular Congresses 
(BPC’s), operating on a local level comparable to municipalities. Each BPC elected an assembly 
whose job it was to elect a secretary as representative in the General People’s Congress (GPC), 
the countries highest legislative body. The GPC appointed secretaries to the General People’s 
Committee, an executive branch that resembled the role of ministers (al-Werfalli 2011: 35-37).  
The Green Book also introduced the idea of a Third Universal Theory, an alternative to the 
bipolar division between capitalism and communism, both of which Gaddafi considered to be 
insufficient for Libya. Instead he proposed a form of socialist state based on Islam, and the 
regime enforced a great deal of redistribution of wealth and resources, which led to a significant 
increase in per capita income compared to the times under the monarchy (St John 2012: 173). 
The reason that the regime could afford this redistribution of wealth was due to large quantity of 
natural resources, predominantly oil, but in the last years of its rule also natural gas. The proven 
oil reserves have been estimated to be the largest in Africa and the gas reserves to be the 3rd 
biggest (St John 2012: 251-252). 
State-enterprises controlled the oil revenues, which played the central role in the regime’s 
supreme reign in the economic realm. Simultaneously the private sector was purposely held 
down whenever it conflicted with the interest of the regime (Chivvis et al. 2012: 11). The oil 
economy was thus also used as a political tool, but the reliance hereon proved to be a double 
edged sword, as shown in the periods where oil revenues dropped. Nevertheless Gaddafi 
managed to sit as the head of state for 42 years before he got overthrown in 2011. 
 
5.2. Authoritarian regimes 
How did Gaddafi balance between the threat from the masses and the threat from the elite in 
order to stay in power? 
 
In this first part of our analysis we utilize the theoretical framework created by Milan W. Svolik 
on authoritarian regimes. Libya’s political system under Gaddafi can be characterized as a 
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dictatorship due to the simple fact that it did not meet the criteria for a democracy, regardless of 
how Gaddafi preferred to refer to Libya as a direct democracy. 
He never allowed for any free and fair elections of the legislature or the executive (Zoubir & 
Rózsa 2012: 1268). However he did create a system of people’s congresses with the authority to 
elect and dismiss public officials. Their authority did not affect the top leadership of the 
revolution though and it was furthermore common that congress attendees too critical of the 
regime were denounced and even arrested by the secret police (St John 2012: 156). The people’s 
congresses  were thus merely a realm created to generate public support from below and the 
limited liberties allowed were to ensure that the regime was still in control of important matters. 
The ideological control over the society became even more profound with the implementation of 
the revolutionary committees, which functioned as watchdogs of the regime and penetrated all 
levels of society (Al-Werfalli 2011: 31).  
  
Gaddafi’s regime cannot be characterized exclusively as either one of Geddes’ three ideal types 
of dictatorships, military, personalist or single-party. Svolik’s point about neither of them being 
mutually exclusive is thus on point in the case of Libya. The 1969 revolution was a military 
coup, carried out by professional soldiers, who after they consolidated power, kept their military 
rank (al-Werfalli 2011: 13). But the regime can just as well be characterized as a personalist 
regime with a very charismatic leader, who in many ways was the main focal point in a political 
system with few formal institutions (Gelvin 2012: 83). 
The last type from Geddes’ typology is the single-party dictatorship, which obviously was not 
the case in Libya since any type of political party was banned. Nevertheless Gaddafi established 
a system where the only way for the Libyan people to exercise authority was through 
government approved official organizations with the Basic Popular Congress at the lowest level, 
which appointed representatives for the national body of General People’s Congress with 
Gaddafi as its Secretary-General (St John 2012: 166-167). It was a hierarchal system that 
restricted political activity to these bodies under the control of the regime, which can be said to 
resemble a single-party system. 
The point about these typologies is not merely that Gaddafi’s regime cannot exclusively be 
characterized as either of them. The interesting analytical point is rather that the regime used a 
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variety of different strategies, approaches and instruments in order to maintain autocratic power, 
and that seemingly contradicting strategies were used simultaneously. 
  
When Gaddafi initially seized power he could not have done it without the support from the Free 
Unionist Officer’s Movement and the original Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). It is 
inherited within the nature of every dictatorship, that the dictator cannot pursue power without 
help from other powerful people, which underlines what Svolik refers to as the problem of 
authoritarian power sharing and Gaddafi proved to be an expert in the discipline of dealing with 
this. 
The establishment of the RCC in 1969 marked a period of seemingly collegial decision-making 
within the council, albeit with Gaddafi as the de facto leader, but that changed radically after the 
coup attempt in 1975 (St John 2012: 165). The failed coup eventually led to the abolishment of 
the RCC and ironically gave Gaddafi the freedom to strengthen his own position. The inside 
threat from his own ruling coalition made him distance himself further from the RCC, the very 
entity that until this point had constituted his ruling coalition. The first step towards this was the 
redistribution of power away from the RCC to the new system of Jamahiriya, the rule of the 
masses, in March 1977, with Gaddafi as the general secretary at the top. The next important step 
was announcing that Gaddafi and his four closest allies from the original RCC would resign from 
the secretariat of the General People’s Congress, the national governmental body, which was 
ideologically shaped by the thoughts expressed in The Green Book. Instead they devoted 
themselves to the revolution and to be the protectors of the newly gained people’s authority (al-
Werfalli 2011: 34). The move effectively separated political and revolutionary activities and 
Gaddafi cobsequently gained the title as Leader of the Revolution. Hereby, Gaddafi not only 
distanced himself from potential threats from within the political system, but also reinforced the 
notion of a reciprocal dependency between his personality and the revolution. Furthermore 
Gaddafi separated himself from the possible backlash of unpopular governmental decision. As St 
John puts it: 
  
“…Qaddafi and his close associates divested themselves of responsibilities and constraints but 
retained the power and authority they had wielded since the outset of the One September 
Revolution” (St John 2012: 169). 
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Even though Gaddafi resigned from formal political authority, he was still very much in control 
over the General People’s Congress and made frequent use of replacing people that were 
considered an inconvenience for the regime. Even officials at highly regarded positions were 
subjects of frequent reshuffles. The purpose was to ensure that no political contender could 
generate power and influence to constitute a potential threat to Gaddafi himself, thus ministers 
got dismissed or replaced to another office from time to time. This strategy was used up until the 
very last years of the regime (St John: 2012: 258). It also had the subsequent effect that none of 
the ministers got too comfortable in their positions and were content with assuming various 
positions for a limited time. 
A similar approach was used when dealing with foreign oil companies that wanted to explore the 
Libyan underground and drill for oil. The National Oil Company that controlled the financial 
rights to the oil fields made contracts with various international companies to avoid domination 
by any single company (St John: 253). Too much financial influence could transfer into political 
influence, which the regime had no interest in. 
  
Gaddafi’s control with the different political and administrative bodies was, to a great extent, 
facilitated by the Revolutionary Committees, which were an additional institution not descending 
from the Green Book. The Revolutionary Committees were made up of some of the keenest 
Gaddafi supporters, generally young people and often with a kin relation to Gaddafi. They 
embodied every institutional layer of society and encouraged right thinking (Gelvin 2012: 72). 
But they also had an even more profound role than to carry out ideological surveillance. As they 
got increasingly more influence they became a main political entity in itself, penetrating the 
official political system: “The revolutionary committees have grown steadily more powerful and 
have evolved into the real force in Libyan politics. They have become the main and in some cases 
the only link between the leadership and the masses” (al-Werfalli 2011: 40). 
Their loyalty towards the regime made the Revolutionary Committees a central authoritarian 
instrument in Gaddafi’s effort to consolidate and secure his own position. With their political 
influence and surveillance present in everything from the congresses, schools, regular jobs and 
even the military, they were a main reason that Gaddafi was able to tackle threats from both the 
masses and from political opponents. 
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Whereas the structures of the influential Revolutionary Committees were very informal, in many 
cases leaning towards secret, the formal institutions of Libya were generally weak or non-
existent. Political parties, trade unions and independent media were illegal, and Gaddafi simply 
refused civil society to blossom. His son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi even backed a law proposal to 
implement apolitical NGO’s into the legislation procedure, but Gaddafi personally rejected it (St 
John 2012: 270). 
Svolik makes a significant point of how formal institutions can help to mitigate the gruesome 
character of a dictatorship and push for better transparency, if the institutions are implemented at 
the centre of political power. However, in Libya the few institutions that did possess any political 
power were either weak or strictly controlled by the regime. The Jamahiriya system of people’s 
authority was strictly controlled by the regime, and even the Basic Popular Congresses at the 
lowest political level, were infiltrated by the Revolutionary Committees (al-Werfalli 2011: 69). 
Furthermore informal relations and personal ties characterized the Libyan society, which is 
highlighted by the presence of patron-client relations (5.4.).    
In 1990, following a period of growing opposition against the regime after decreasing oil 
revenues in the last part of the 1980’s, delegates of the GPC actually rejected a governmental 
effort to reduce public expenditures. Gaddafi then succeeded in getting the GPC itself to promote 
him to the position of supreme leader, which gave him authority to reject any policy decision 
from the GPC he might have been dissatisfied with (St John 2012: 222). He then later made 
another ministerial reshuffle of people in key positions. 
The latter instance shows how a formal institution can only really affect the power relation 
between the dictator and the ruling coalition if the share of power is at least relatively even. 
However, if the dictator controls a very large share of power, as was the case in Gaddafi’s 
regime, the institutions cannot change much. The dictator might even purposely neglect the 
formal rules of the institutions inasmuch as he is not threatened by the ruling coalition, an issue 
which Gaddafi gave much attention by constantly preventing any potential rivals from emerging. 
With the absence of a credible threat from the elite Gaddafi’s regime had developed into what 
Svolik refers to as an established autocracy, where it was very unlikely that he would have gotten 
overthrown by anyone from his own ruling coalition.  
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Without any civil society to lobby for formal rights, the civic population had limited possibilities 
of making any progressive change regarding their own daily lives and had to rely on a political 
system towards which many felt alienated. In June 1988 Gaddafi and the regime changed their 
attitude towards human rights radically, when they adopted a “Great Green Charter” on human 
rights with an emphasis on legal accountability, respect for personal liberty and general human 
rights (St John 2012: 198). The charter varied radically from previous practices, and despite the 
charter being formally adopted, human rights groups and observers noted little change in the 
protection of basic rights and freedoms. In fact the regime managed to take advantage of its 
ideological framework, ambiguous in its very core, by not acknowledging the cleavage between 
theory and practice as justification for not implementing real change: 
  
“There remained no room for a free press on the false assumption the Libyan people were free to 
express themselves at the people’s congresses. There was no right to strike because Libyans 
theoretically were the owners of the factories where they worked. There was no place for 
organized opposition because Libyans theoretically were free to express their opposition within 
the congress system” (St John 2012: 199). 
  
Gaddafi used a similar tactic when dealing with the armed forces, from which his own rise to the 
power ironically had originated. The armed forces had deliberately been under-prioritized 
economically due to the potential threat an organized army could pose (Holm 2011: 45-46). In 
1988 Gaddafi announced that he would get rid of large parts of the regular army and police 
forces and instead replace them with a new popular guard, echoing the ideology of Jamahiriya 
(St John 2012: 200). In practice resources were redistributed from the army to security forces 
more loyal to the regime.  
Thus, unlike in neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia, the army conversely did not constitute an 
autonomous institution with power to overthrow the government. As a possible consequence of 
Gaddafi neglecting the armed forces, a considerable amount of officers resisted direct orders to 
use force against the protesters when the big protests started in 2011 (Zoubir & Rózsa 2012: 
1272). 
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Gaddafi chose to keep the armed forces relatively weak with small supplies of arms and 
ammunition, and similarly to the ministerial reshuffles he kept on rotating the officer corps in 
order to hinder personal loyalty within units (St John 2012: 280). 
 As Svolik emphasizes, he could only manage to do so because the threat of the masses to 
remove him was not likely during the majority of his rule. On the other hand a weak military can 
make a regime vulnerable towards internal revolts and internationalist interventions. 
Gaddafi 
  
 
5.2.1. Sub-conclusion 
Gaddafi managed to create a political system where the political power first and foremost 
revolved around him as a person. The constant reshuffling of officials in influential positions  
proved to be a clever strategic move that undermined potential threats and simultaneously 
reinforced Gaddafi’s arbitrary position as the leader of the revolution. He succeeded to formally 
distance himself from the political system, while ambiguously sustaining effective control over 
both the General People’s Congress and, via the revolutionary committees, the Basic Popular 
Congresses.  
In actuality the function of the alleged direct democracy was merely an instrument of concealing 
the autocratic nature of the Libyan state and keeping the masses from articulating any real 
opposition, while at the same time rejecting any form of civil society to blossom. The 
redistribution of resources from the military to more loyal security forces was likewise enforced 
to keep a potential threat as unlikely and futile as possible.  
Gaddafi possessed such a big share of power that institutions and the population in general had 
little success in mitigating or altering the autocratic character of his regime.            
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5.3. Legitimacy  
Which ways of creating a sense of legitimacy can be identified in Gaddafi’s manner of securing 
his right to rule? 
  
As mentioned in continuation of the research question, when using the term legitimacy, we do 
not refer to democratic legitimacy, but rather to the recognition Gaddafi managed to create of his 
right to rule. 
Al-Werfalli argues that the regime after the military coup in 1969 lacked justification of its rule 
because it was not based on the legal rational base or traditional authority. Thus, its rule had to 
be established on other ways of justifying a regime’s right to rule. 
One way of doing this was to rely on Gaddafi’s charismatic appearance(al-Werfalli 2011: 25), 
which among others was built on the fact that he was taking much pride in being a Libyan. His 
ideals of pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism, which followed a popular wave of new ideas in the 
Arab world in the 1960’s, can be said to have strengthened the inspirational character of 
Gaddafi’s leadership, which further established him as a charismatic leader (al-Werfalli 
2011:14). Gaddafi’s ideals also had an influence on the population’s recognition of his charisma, 
as the majority of the population was said to identify with those ideals and thereby 
acknowledged the base of his charisma, without which the effect of it would have been 
insignificant. This identification contributed to create a feeling of stability, even though Libya at 
that time was still in a transitional period. Additionally, Gaddafi frequently rotated the ministers 
in his regime (St John 2012: 258), which also created some sort of stability around him as a 
person, as he was the only one who remained in his position. Gaddafi was perceived as 
indispensable for the political system in Libya as a whole, which set his personality even further 
apart from the rest of the population and thereby underpinned the notion of him as a charismatic 
leader. Even though opposition certainly existed, in the majority of Gaddafi’s rule it has been 
considered very fragmented, as Gaddafi had been relatively successful in promoting his 
charismatic leadership. It is important to note that this leadership was successful not only due to 
his charisma, but also due to the level of performance by the regime in delivering results of the 
promised ideals, as this an important element in sustaining charismatic legitimacy. 
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As mentioned in the background section of the analysis, Gaddafi’s regime emphasized the 
redistribution of resources and wealth, especially in the first decade of its rule. This indicates an 
attempt of legitimizing his rule through eudaemonic legitimacy. The regime’s way of 
redistributing resources was through socio economic policies, especially in the first half of the 
70’s, that aimed to provide better housing and improved healthcare for the population (St John 
2012: 149). These policies can be perceived as a way of creating support of the new regime 
among the population, which is confirmed by the fact that the regime managed to continue 
gaining support throughout the 70’s due to the fact that per capita income had increased 
significantly (St John 2012: 173). Simply put, it can be stated that many Libyans implicitly 
accepted a limited political and social freedom in exchange for relatively high living standards 
(St John 2012: 261). One can therefore assess that Gaddafi and his regime succeeded with the 
strategy of buying support in the mentioned decade. This also contributed to the creation of a 
state of stability, as opposition was fragmented by the regime’s ability to deliver resources and 
thereby keep the population satisfied. 
However, as this way of legitimizing a rule is dependant on the ability to provide resources, it 
got increasingly difficult for Gaddafi’s regime to maintain this method when it became difficult 
to provide the mentioned services to the Libyan population due to the drop in oil prices in the 
1980s (al-Werfalli 2011: 22). This is illustrated by the following quotation: 
  
“In the second decade of the revolution, opposition to the socioeconomic policies of the regime 
increased sharply because a drop in oil revenues due to lower prices meant the revolutionary 
government no longer had the resources necessary to buy popular consensus”. (St John 2012: 
173) 
  
The vulnerability of eudaemonic legitimacy is evident in the above, as it shows how the support 
of the regime in the population quickly decreased when the usual benefits were no longer 
delivered. In the period of falling oil prices, the regime could not afford to keep up the strategy 
of buying support, which left them with a dissatisfied population whose demands were not met. 
At that time the regime can thus be said to have lacked legitimacy. The dissatisfaction with the 
regime’s outputs among the population resulted in growing resistance, with opposition against 
the regime increasing in the last part of the 1980s in particular (St John 2012: 221). Thus, the 
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inability to provide social and economic benefits for its citizens led to lack of support and 
legitimacy. Gaddafi’s reaction to this was to open up for some degree of liberalization in 1987 
(St John 2012: 194) which can be regarded as an attempt of retaining support and restoring 
stability in the society.   
 
As evident in the above, the effectiveness of the Libyan regime has played an important role in 
sustaining charismatic and eudaemonic legitimacy and therefore in sustaining stability in the 
Libyan society. Gaddafi’s regime managed to create stability in the first decade of its rule as it, 
among others, had a lot of specific support due to the fact that it distributed socioeconomic 
benefits. Due to this primarily materialistic way of creating support, it can be argued that the 
longer lasting diffuse support, which would have contributed to maintain support even though 
the regime was not able to provide benefits, was not created. This can be seen as an explanation 
for the increasing difficulties, which Gaddafi’s regime experienced in creating stability in the 
Libyan society towards the end of its rule. Even when oil prices increased after the crisis in the 
1980s, Libya was still facing high unemployment rates combined with a high birth rate (St John 
2012: 247). Thus, the regime faced challenges in creating specific support, as jobs were not 
created and the regime failed to meet the demands of the population. Due to the fact that it had 
previously relied on this kind of support for a large part of legitimizing its rule, the diffuse 
support was minimal. Consequently, the stability in Libya was threatened. 
 
Due to the vulnerability of the mentioned ways of securing legitimacy among the population, 
Gaddafi’s regime also had to rely on other methods of creating support in the population. In the 
beginning of his time of reign, Gaddafi, as mentioned, focused a lot on his ideals of pan-Arabism 
and anti-colonialism. This clearly separated him from the monarchy he and his allies had 
overturned, which was associated with pro-western and traditionalist values (al-Werfalli 2011: 
14).  Gaddafi strengthened the legitimacy of his regime by clarifying how it would be different 
than the monarchy and promised the following of new, popular ideals and the correction of the 
monarchy’s mistakes. Thus, it can be argued that Gaddafi, by emphasizing the lack of legitimacy 
of the earlier regime, strengthened his position through what al-Werfalli terms negative 
legitimacy. An example hereof can also be found in Gaddafi’s way of dealing with international, 
especially western, companies and institutions in Libya. In 1969, he evacuated the British and 
44 
American military bases (St John 2012: 142) and the regime dealt with some international oil 
companies by confronting them with assumptions of colonial exploitation (St John 2012: 149). 
This was a way of weakening the western influence in Libya, which legitimized his rule due to 
the negative legitimacy, but at the same time also strengthened his own power in the country. 
However, negative legitimacy cannot last indefinitely, which is why Gaddafi’s regime also had 
to rely on other measures to create a sense of legitimacy. During the largest part of his reign, 
Gaddafi was strongly associated with the revolution and was portrayed as its leader and front 
figure. Instead of being named as president he referred to himself as “Brotherly leader and guide 
of the revolution” (Gelvin 2012: 71). This so-called revolutionary legitimacy was underpinned 
when Gaddafi in 1979 dissociated himself from any formal political positions and dedicated 
himself solely to the role as leader of the revolution (St John 2012: 169). However, he retained 
the same power as before, and many of his acts were justified by the fact that he was an advocate 
of the revolutionary ideals. For instance when oil, gas and other sectors of the economy became 
government controlled (St John 2012: 148), it was legitimized by the ideals of socialism 
prominent in the revolution, although it was also a way of solidifying the regime’s control over 
Libya and consequently the power of Gaddafi himself. This confirms the fact that regimes 
sometimes use their revolutionary legitimacy to justify acts that were not a part of the original 
revolutionary agenda. 
Actions that underpin this are initiatives like the revolutionary court system that was established 
in 1975, where members of the revolutionary committees were able to rule without any bound to 
penal code (St John 2012: 174). 
 At the end of its days, Gaddafi’s regime attempted to implement policies promoting 
privatization and the like, which were seemingly contradictory to the ideals of the revolution and 
the “Green Book” (St John 2012: 264). This illustrates how revolutionary legitimacy is also a 
questionable strategy of creating legitimacy when a regime relies on it for too long, like it may 
have been the case with Gaddafi’s regime. 
  
The mentioned dissatisfaction with the regime and its performance has several different 
consequences for the bond between regime and citizen. Often it results in the opposite sentiment 
than political support, namely political alienation. One reason for political alienation is the 
feeling of inefficacy. The institution that was considered as the main vehicle for participation in 
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Gaddafi’s system of “direct democracy” was the Basic Popular Congress (BPC) (al-Werfalli 
2011: preface, xv). With point of departure in her surveys, al-Werfalli argues that citizens felt 
inefficacious when participating in BPC meetings, as some groups, especially members of the 
Revolutionary Committees, dominated the discussion (al-Werfalli 2011: 107). It can thus be 
argued that parts of the population felt that their influence on politics would never be significant 
or effective.  This is underlined by initiatives like the mentioned revolutionary court system, as 
members of the Revolutionary Committees ruled with no bond to, and in no manner influenced 
by, the citizens. The court system illustrates the increase in power of the Revolutionary 
Committees and at the same time the decrease in power for the population, which may have 
contributed to the citizens feeling even more inefficacious. The feeling of inefficacy is closely 
related to the feeling of powerlessness, as the above stated problematic of participating in BPC 
meetings can also be identified as a shortcoming in the channels of participation due to the fact 
that the citizens did not actually have the possibility to express their thoughts freely and 
influence the political agenda, as they liked. Consequently, it can be argued that even though the 
means of participation formally existed, in the shape of BPCs and the like, the actual 
participation was inadequate. This is underpinned by the fact that no actual freedom of speech 
existed, as people that were too critical of the revolution and its ideals were frequently arrested 
(St John 2012: 156). Additionally, Werfalli states that the reasons for attendance to the BPC 
meetings were primarily the fear of getting into trouble or due to force (al-Werfalli 2011: 56), 
which further undermines the means of participation in Gaddafi’s Libya. 
In relation to the feelings of inefficacy and powerlessness it is important to note that these 
feelings would not necessarily mean that parts of the Libyan population felt politically alienated. 
However, as it has been argued earlier in this section, dissatisfaction with Gaddafi’s regime 
increased towards the end. As dissatisfaction with the regime increases the probability of 
inefficacious and powerless individuals to feel alienated, one can argue that the feeling of 
political alienation among the Libyan population also increased towards the end of the regime’s 
rule. 
Politically alienated individuals behave in a certain way, and examples of all three types of 
behaviour could be found in Libya. A part of the population in Libya was certainly sceptical 
towards other factions taking over the country (St John 2012: 258). The quote “rather the devil 
you know, than the devil you don’t know”  (al-Werfalli 2011: 150) clearly illustrates the 
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prevalent fear of the unknown, and thus the support for a status quo, in these parts of the 
population. One of the reasons for this frame of mind in the population can be Gaddafi’s success 
in creating an image of him as a charismatic political leader who, as mentioned earlier, was the 
only stable factor in the political landscape of Libya. The system was dependent on Gaddafi and 
his ideas, which can be an explanation for the citizens fearing a Libya without Gaddafi and the 
instability that might follow with a new regime. 
However, as shown above opposition increased during the time of Gaddafi’s rule, and especially 
towards the end, which shows some sort of reformist or revolutionist attitudes of the citizens in 
Libya. Especially the youth in Libya was said to be dissatisfied with the regime and to partly 
support violence as a revolutionary measure (al-Werfalli 2011: 127).  
  
5.3.1. Sub-conclusion 
Concluding from this section of the analysis Gaddafi can be said to have created a sense of 
legitimacy of his regime in several different ways. Through his charismatic personality and the 
values that followed it, the Libyan people identified with this strong leader and essential figure in 
Libyan politics, which created identification with and support of the new regime. Also, Gaddafi’s 
regime legitimized its rule through eudaemonic legitimacy, which manifested itself in 
socioeconomic policies that redistributed resources to the population. The regime especially 
made use of this strategy in the beginning of its rule and succeeded for a while in buying the 
specific support of its citizens.  Besides these strategies, Gaddafi also used the ideals of the 
revolution for justifying the actions taken during his rule, and he was in this context portrayed as 
the ultimate leader of the revolution and advocate of its ideals. 
These ways of legitimizing his rule and the character of the Libyan institutions led to parts of the 
population feeling inefficacious and powerless as they did not consider themselves to have any 
significant influence on politics and did not actually have the possibility of expressing their 
political thoughts. This contributed to some groups in the population taking on a status-quo 
attitude towards the question of changing the regime, which shows a relative success in 
Gaddafi’s ways of legitimizing his rule. Also it resulted in revolutionist and reformist attitudes 
among the population, which might illustrate Gaddafi’s failing in creating stability. 
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5.4. Neopatrimonialism 
Which neopatrimonial mechanisms can be identified in Gaddafi’s regime? 
 
The definition of a neopatrimonial state is amongst others the overlapping between the private 
and public, the political and economic and the traditional and modern in society. This overlap 
can also be identified in Libya under Gaddafi. For instance, the “Green Book”, in which Gaddafi 
advocates for the implementation of direct democracy, and the concept of the Basic Popular 
Congresses can be regarded as an attempt of creating public institutions, as  they were meant to 
be a means through which citizens could influence politics, yet it was saturated by Gaddafi’s 
own ideas and expectations.  Furthermore, another overlap between the public and private can be 
identified in the fact that the government took over control of the oil sector (St John 2012: 148), 
which one can argue illustrates that Gaddafi and his ruling elite partly treated state resources as 
their own to hereby promote the revolutionist ideals. 
 
In 1978 Gaddafi enforced that hundreds of Libyan companies were to be taken over by the newly 
elected People’s Committees (St John 2012: 168), which is evidence of how the state interfered 
with and undermined the private sector in order to achieve political control. Additionally, the 
composition of these People’s Committees was often restructured until it was found sufficient for 
Gaddafi’s demands (St John 2012: 168). These are examples of how patron-clientelism can 
penetrate society, when personal relations are prioritized over capabilities and merits. The 
importance of Gaddafi’s personal opinion and the loyalty shown towards him indicates that, even 
as bureaucracy and public affairs appear, the traditional power of the authoritarian leader remains 
of extensive value in this context. However, even though distinctions between the private and 
public spheres in Libya appeared blurred, they existed at least formally, which shows that 
Gaddafi’s regime can be characterized as neopatrimonial rather than patrimonial.  
Neopatrimonial regimes and the leaders hereof are said to maintain authority through material 
incentives. As mentioned in the previous part of the analysis, Gaddafi’s regime focused a lot on 
redistributing resources to the population, which resulted in a dramatic increase in per capita 
income compared to the monarchy and the neighbouring states (St John 2012: 173). Gaddafi’s 
powerful position and access to resources created the ability to initiate comprehensive 
socioeconomic policies that aimed to provide services such as better housing and healthcare (St 
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John 2012: 149). Gaddafi and his regime provided these benefits to the population, which in this 
context can be defined as clients, as they, compared to Gaddafi, lacked both power and wealth. 
In return for these benefits, the population provided their support of the regime. Thus, Gaddafi as 
the patron transferred resources to the population, which, in their role as clients in the patron-
client relation, reciprocated by supporting the regime.  
Even though the relation is uneven, it is important to be aware that Gaddafi is also dependent on 
the fact that the clients perceive him, the patron, as an irreplaceable figure in the maintenance of 
their level of material well-being. 
 
According to the above, Gaddafi can be defined as a so-called political entrepreneur, since he 
maintains support by providing political rewards. Gaddafi has regularly been portrayed as the 
leader of the revolution and the founder of people’s authority (al-Werfalli 2011: 39). One can 
therefore argue that a cult of his persona has been created, which is typical for the political 
entrepreneur, the leader, in neopatrimonial regimes. This is substantiated by the fact that Gaddafi 
was the only person in the ruling elite that remained in his position as revolutionary leader. Other 
ministers of the regime were frequently reshuffled (St John 2012: 258), which may have 
strengthened the cult around his persona even more. It can also be argued that some political 
initiatives, like the GPC taking over import, export and distribution functions (St John 2012: 
172), primarily were a reflection of Gaddafi’s personality and his alleged socialist ideals. 
 In relation to the above, Gaddafi also played the role of being a father figure of the Libyan 
nation. Due to this status as founder of the revolution and of the system of “direct democracy”, 
Gaddafi could be characterized as the so-called pater familias. This had the outcome that the fact 
that him and a few others ruled everything in Libya was partly legitimized by his image as a 
strict but fair father figure of the country (St John 2012: 163). 
 
When discussing Gaddafi as a neopatrimonial leader it is important to touch upon his relation to 
the institutions in Libya. An example hereof can be seen in the BPCs, where citizens were 
arrested for expressing critical views of the regime (St John 2012: 156). As mentioned, formal 
democratic institutions existed, however only in theory, as they were undermined by informal 
authoritarian structures from within. The latter is underpinned by Gaddafi’s lacking explanation 
of how the system of direct democracy was to be implemented, since it emphasizes how 
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democracy under Gaddafi primarily existed in theory (St John 2012: 162). All these, primarily 
non-democratic, structures might also have been partly legitimized by Gaddafi’s status as pater 
familias and thereby have been accepted by the population for at least some period of time. 
To maintain his power, Gaddafi did not only rely on the functioning of these formally democratic 
institutions in Libya. Clientelism, especially political clientelism, played an extensive role in 
Libya. An example of Gaddafi using clientelism to remain in power is the example of the 
distribution of resources mentioned earlier in this part of the analysis. As stated, Gaddafi would 
give a material advantage, for instance better housing, education and healthcare, to the 
population, which in return would result in a political advantage for himself qua the support of 
his citizens. Thus, the clientelism in Libya under Gaddafi can be identified as political 
clientelism.  
 
When investigating clientelist practices in Libya, examples of both mass and elite clientelism can 
be identified. The example presented above is an evident case of mass clientelism, as it is a case 
of Gaddafi using state resources to provide services to the population, which in this context can 
be defined as his mass political clientele. To some degree, maintaining this relationship 
contributed to maintaining stability in the society. 
The extensive degree of patronage seen in the above is the essence of mass clientelism, which is 
why maintaining it requires a reasonably healthy and effective state. Gaddafi and his regime 
were the first revolutionary government in the Arab world that was wealthy (St John 2012: 152). 
The wealth was built upon oil revenues (St John 2012: 149), which might be part of the 
explanation for how and why it was possible for Gaddafi to maintain this way of creating a 
political advantage for his regime. 
Due to this dependence on oil revenues, Libya can be characterized as a rentier state. The issue 
of rentierism is likewise closely related to clientelism as the role hereof is often extensive in 
rentier states, which, as it has been proven above, is also the case in Libya under Gaddafi. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe how mass clientelism decreased during Gaddafi’s time of 
rule. Due to the collapse in oil prices in the late 1970’s and early 80’s (St John 2012: 173) the 
regime was no longer able to afford this kind of extensive and expensive patronage. Also, during 
the 1990’s oil production was weakened and not enough jobs were created (St John 2012: 247). 
Thus, the Libyan state could no longer provide material advantages to the population in the shape 
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of jobs or other socioeconomic benefits, which indicates that it was no longer able to sustain 
mass clientelism. 
 
 
This leads us towards the other kind of clientelism that can be identified in Libya, namely elite 
clientelism, which is limited to a narrow elite rather than encompassing a mass clientele. 
Interestingly Gaddafi in the beginning of his rule had tried to eliminate the power of the Libyan 
tribes, and then later on relied on them as part of his rule: “By 1979, however, it had become 
evident that the tribal organisation of the society could not be eliminated; therefore, Qaddafi 
decided instead to rely on and build his power on the tribes” (Zoubir & Rózsa 2012: 1270).  
This shows how Gaddafi, in addition to mass clientelism, had to rely on a ruling elite that would 
function as his associates and thereby give him a political advantage. Gaddafi’s u-turn is an 
indicator of the tribes’ importance in social relations in Libya and his cooptation of them, despite 
his initial animosity towards them, shows that the patron-client dependence can go the other way 
around as well. It is also interesting to note that Gaddafi needed an alliance with the tribes, when 
one thinks about his personal domination in the formal political realm (5.2) 
    
In 1994 Gaddafi created a nationwide body entitled People’s Social Leadership Committee 
(PSLC) consisting of tribal leaders, heads of important families and other elite personas. It was 
created to prevent opposition and maintain social stability in the country and over the years 
PSLC gained increasing political influence (St John 2012: 267). The latter illustrates how 
Gaddafi distributed certain public offices to some key personalities of the tribes and important 
families of the country in order to create a political advantage in the shape of stability. This kind 
of distribution of public offices to elite personas is a key element in elite clientelism. Gaddafi’s 
influence on who assumed which offices is emphasized by the fact that he, for instance, 
frequently organized re-elections of the people’s committees in the GPC (General People’s 
Congress) to make sure that it consisted of people loyal to him and his ideals and that nobody 
had the possibility to threaten his power (St John 2012: 168). Since the goal of elite clientelism is 
to keep the leader and its allies in power, this behaviour of keeping loyal people in the elite can 
also be considered as a way of ensuring Gaddafi’s ability to remain in charge. Additionally, like 
other authoritarian leaders, he kept a strong repression system involving relatives and close 
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associates at important powerful positions (Gelvin 2012: 73), which, like the above, might have 
been a measure that was taken to secure his reign.  
 
The manner in which Gaddafi distributed resources to the elite based on connections and 
political importance is clearly correlated with the nature of rentier states, as the allocation of 
resources is based on the connection to Gaddafi and the ruling elite, rather than on labour or 
personal capacity. 
In order to sustain elite clientelism in a society, it is required that institutionalization is weak. 
Earlier in this part of the analysis we have argued that the formal democratic institutions in Libya 
only existed in theory. Due to the arguments above, it can be stated that politics in Libya under 
Gaddafi were more dependent on clientelist relations than on these institutions. This may have 
had the outcome that citizens in Libya felt loyalty towards something else than the institutions, as 
they mainly relied on the right connections and clientelist networks. The fact that the citizens 
developed loyalty to something other than the formal institutions is also one of the characteristics 
of a rentier state like Libya, where Gaddafi did not have the incentive to extract money from the 
Libyan citizens through taxation or the like because of sufficient revenues from the oil industry. 
Thus, the most important tie between the ruler and his population is the one of clientelism. This 
strengthens the theoretical argument of elite clientelism being more important for political 
stability than mass clientelism, since it underpins the importance of creating loyalty in the elite to 
be able to maintain a stable rule. 
During the uprising in Libya, where stability was evidently at its lowest, most of the tribes that 
had been loyal to Gaddafi in his time of reign remained neutral. This might be evidence of them 
waiting to see who would be in charge after Gaddafi so they would be able to keep a beneficial 
relation and still receive material advantages in return for their providence of political benefits to 
the new elite. The latter shows the uneven, but nonetheless reciprocal, relationship between 
patron and client in clientelism. 
As it has become obvious through the analysis of elite and mass clientelism in Libya, cases of the 
execution of both kinds can be identified in Libya. However, the line between mass and elite 
clientelism is not as distinct as it might appear from this analysis. On the contrary, the distinction 
is particularly blurry. An example of the overlapping of these categories could be the 
Revolutionary Committees. On one hand, one could argue that these could be characterized as 
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part of Gaddafi’s elite, since they were said to function as his “watchdogs” and were created to 
advocate Gaddafi’s ideals and prevent other ideologies or forms of tribalism (al-Werfalli 2011: 
39). Consequently, this can be considered as a case of elite clientelism, as Gaddafi distributed 
political power to certain groups. On the other hand, the number of Revolutionary Committees 
was large and comprised a large part of the population, which might point towards mechanisms 
of mass clientelism in the relation between Gaddafi and the mass clientele consisting of members 
of the Revolutionary Committees. 
However, in both definitions political clientelism is evident, since the Revolutionary Committees 
provided a political advantage for Gaddafi and accordingly received material advantages in 
return. This is underpinned by people’s reasons for joining those committees. Whereas a large 
number of members of the committees joined due to their commitment to the revolutionist ideals, 
a number of people also joined due to other reasons: 
  
“Nevertheless, there appear to have been a number of people who joined the RCs for personal 
reasons, e.g., in expectation of certain benefits; to protects their interests; to obtain better jobs; 
to improve their economic and social standing…” 
(al-Werfalli 2011: 65) 
  
This illustrates the population’s side of the patron-client relation and shows how some people 
were willing to offer their support of Gaddafi’s ideals in order to receive the mentioned material 
benefits and advantages. 
Lastly, a central element in a neopatrimonial society is corruption. In Libya under Gaddafi, 
corruption was widespread and considered as part of the system (Gelvin 2012: 73). This is linked 
with the elements of clientelism in Libya, where material advantages were offered in order to 
receive support, in other words votes. The fact that corruption made up such a big part in Libya 
politics was gradually during Gaddafi’s rule considered increasingly problematic by the citizens 
(al-Werfalli 2011: 103). 
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5.4.1. Sub-conclusion 
Due to an overlap of the functioning of public institutions and Gaddafi’s private interests as well 
as an overlap of private and political interests in economic issues of the ownership of oil 
reserves, Libya can be characterized as a state of neopatrimonial character. Patron-client 
relations are apparent in the uneven relationship with Gaddafi in a powerful position where he, as 
the patron, had access to a large extent of resources, and the population, lacking both wealth and 
power, providing their political support for Gaddafi in return for the material advantages 
distributed by him. Furthermore, Gaddafi can be defined as a political entrepreneur and it can be 
said that a cult has been created of his persona and his status as father of the Libyan nation. It is 
important to note that even though Gaddafi is the predominant patron, his alliance with the tribal 
leaders indicates a reciprocal dependence relation.  
Formal institutions in Libya existed primarily in theory and instead politics relied on political 
clientelism. Cases of mass clientelism can be identified in Gaddafi’s way of distributing 
resources to large parts of the population and the population giving their support of his regime in 
return. It was possible to uphold this clientelism for some time due to oil revenues and the rentier 
nature of Libya. Elite clientelism can be identified in the way in which public offices were 
distributed to important tribes and families. Gaddafi reshuffled these key personalities frequently 
to secure loyalty towards his regime. This type of clientelism was possible due to Libya’s weak 
institutions. Parts of the population, for instance, joined the Revolutionary Committees primarily 
to secure personal advantages in the shape of jobs or other material goods. Corruption in Libya 
was essential in helping to sustain clientelism. 
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6. Discussion 
During the analysis we have illustrated three different perspectives on how Gaddafi dealt with 
the population and the ruling elite in his time of rule. These perspectives all show different ways 
of stabilizing an autocratic regime and creating a sense of stability in the population. In our work 
with the analysis we have discovered how these three different perspectives on the relation 
between Gaddafi, the population and the elite may have supplemented each other in creating 
stability in Libya. 
Something that contributed to Gaddafi staying in power for as long as he did is the fact that he 
was regarded as indispensable for the political system in Libya. The system revolved around him 
as a person. Gaddafi constantly reshuffled other officials in order to reinforce his power and 
position as the leader, and at the same time to prevent other officials from gaining too much 
power and thereby the ability to threaten his position. The constant removal of potential threats 
from the elite was Gaddafi’s way of dealing with the problem of authoritarian power sharing, but 
it also secured his own position as the undisputed leader, whose charisma no one could match. 
The legitimacy that was build up upon his personal character and his revolutionary merits and 
accomplishments, could not have been identified with anyone else. This notion of Gaddafi as 
indispensable was also an important factor in dealing with the masses, which he often did via the 
Revolutionary Committees, which functioned as his main political instrument. The informal 
structure could only function due to the members’ high level of loyalty towards Gaddafi as a 
person, which to a large extent was created through clientelism and thus the offering of rewards 
in the shape of material benefits or a position in certain public offices. The loyalty of the 
Revolutionary Committees is highlighted by the fact that they reported directly to the 
revolutionary leadership. This loyalty towards an individual might be evidence of the neo-
patrimonial character of Gaddafi’s Libya and particularly the notion of Gaddafi as a father-figure 
of the nation.   
 
One can argue that Gaddafi’s socialist ideals were also used to legitimize the expropriation of 
energy resources in Libya. However, while this might have been motivated by ideals, it also had 
the effect that it contributed to the increase of Gaddafi’s power and that it decreased the risk for 
international companies or internal rivals to have too much economic and political power, which 
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could end up endangering Gaddafi’s rule. Thus, this can also be said to have contributed to the 
creation of stability around Gaddafi’s regime. 
In his way of dealing with other officials in the regime, Gaddafi depended greatly on elite 
clientelism. He secured the loyalty of the elite by distributing certain public offices and material 
benefits and in return received the political advantage in the form of the elite’s support and 
thereby stability and accept of his rule. The means of elite clientelism and handling of officials in 
general was possible due to the weak institutionalization of Libya. Gaddafi had created formal 
institutions in the process of implementing direct democracy, yet these institutions only existed 
in theory and were created to lessen the possibility of opposition from the masses. Gaddafi and 
his ruling elite were still in power and it was compulsory to follow their ideas. In order to tackle 
threats from the population and control the administrative bodies, Gaddafi, as mentioned, used 
the Revolutionary Committees as an authoritarian instrument to oppress voices critical of the 
regime, and citizens that expressed critical views were arrested. This was a means of preventing 
opposition and thus maintaining stability by not making room for critique of Gaddafi’s political 
agenda.  
 
Since Gaddafi still was the one with ultimate power, even though institutions existed, the power 
share was thus uneven. However, Gaddafi managed to maintain some degree of stability as he 
was able, as the patron and political leader, to provide a material advantage in the form of socio 
economic benefits to the population. Consequently, his relation to the masses can be said to have 
consisted of mass clientelism, which further created eudaemonic legitimacy. Even though the 
population had no actual influence on politics, Gaddafi satisfied it by redistributing resources, 
succeeded in buying their support and thereby lessened the possibility of opposition. The primary 
reason that Libya was able to afford this way of creating support were the oil revenues, which is 
why the rentier nature of Libya can also be said to have contributed to the creation of stability. 
Nonetheless, Gaddafi evidently was not able to maintain stability in the Libyan society. For 
instance, the above-mentioned method of mass clientelism, which created eudaemonic 
legitimacy, is a particularly expensive way of obtaining support in the population. As it includes 
a large part of the population, the Libyan state needed to continue being effective to be able to 
provide the benefits central to this kind of relation to avoid a dissatisfied population. That makes 
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it a vulnerable method, as most regimes have difficulties in keeping up these high standards for a 
longer period of time. 
Additionally, the charismatic and partly the revolutionary legitimacy of Gaddafi were vulnerable 
after a period of time as it was difficult to keep relying on his personality and the ideals of the 
revolution for all of his time of rule. 
Lastly, the fact that democratic institutions in Libya only existed in theory resulted in parts of the 
population feeling inefficacious and powerless as they could not actually influence the political 
system. Since the population also was dissatisfied due to the regime’s difficulties in providing 
economic benefits this resulted in a feeling of political alienation. Some of these alienated 
individuals felt that the best solution to government challenges was the status quo, which 
illustrates Gaddafi’s success in creating an image of him as indispensable for the political system 
in Libya. Nevertheless, the majority of the Libyan people thought that the system was in need of 
reform or revolution. The uprising in 2011 shows how Gaddafi failed to maintain stability in 
Libya in the end. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we will conclude on all parts of the analysis. 
Based on the analysis of Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime we can conclude that Gaddafi managed 
to create a political system that revolved around him as a person. He frequently reshuffled 
officials to reinforce his own power and undermine threats from within the elite and thereby 
created stability around his regime. Institutions in Libya only existed to conceal the autocratic 
nature of the state and thus to avoid real opposition. Gaddafi controlled the functioning of the 
institutions via the Revolutionary Committees and by doing so remained in power. 
Consequently, the population had no possibility to actually influence politics. 
Inferring from the analysis of the ways in which Gaddafi legitimized his rule, we can conclude 
that Gaddafi’s charismatic personality contributed to creating support of his rule. This is also the 
case with his revolutionist ideals, which legitimized some of Gaddafi’s actions concerning the 
decrease in power of international oil companies and the like. Furthermore, Gaddafi, especially 
in the beginning of his rule, earned specific support of the population by offering socioeconomic 
benefits. 
 
According to the analysis of neopatrimonial mechanisms in Gaddafi’s Libya, it can be concluded 
that Libya can be characterized as a neopatrimonial state with Gaddafi as the powerful patron in 
possession of resources and the population, which lacks both power and wealth, as clients. 
Gaddafi had created an image of himself as father of the Libyan nation, however he was also 
dependent on his alliance with the tribes. As formal institutions in Libya only existed in theory, 
he relied on mass clientelism by providing material advantages to the population that 
reciprocated by giving him a political advantage in the form of support. He also relied on elite 
clientelism by distributing certain public offices to the mentioned tribes and important families 
who therefore supported Gaddafi’s rule. 
By discussing these different approaches on how to deal with the population and the elite in 
order to maintain stability we can conclude that they overlap and supplement each other in 
several areas. The reshuffling of official fortified and was made possible due to Gaddafi’s 
charismatic personality and his revolutionary merits. The institutions, not least the Revolutionary 
Committees, functioned as well as they did because loyalty towards Gaddafi was created through 
clientelist relations, which created support of the regime. Additionally, Gaddafi’s status as pater 
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familias contributed to the creation of this loyalty and support. Furthermore, his handling of 
international companies, officially motivated by socialist and revolutionist ideals, also 
contributed to the shaping of Gaddafi as autocratic leader. The fact that Gaddafi’s relation to the 
masses to a large extent consisted of mass clientelism helped to create eudaemonic legitimacy 
which in turn created stability. The rentier nature of Libya plays an important role in making this 
way of legitimizing a rule possible. 
Consequently, Gaddafi, according to our analysis and discussion, can be said to have maintained 
stability in Libya in numerous different ways. These different ways are intertwined and have 
supplemented each other and made it possible to create a stable society inspite of a lack of 
democratic legitimacy. 
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8. Further perspectives 
In this present project we have deliberately chosen to focus on Libya under Gaddafi’s regime and 
have thereby delimited ourselves from what happened when the uprisings emerged, the civil war 
broke out and the new political situation that occurred after the death of Gaddafi and the formal 
victory of the rebels. At the time of writing it has almost been two years since Gaddafi’s death 
and a plethora of significant events have taken place, a great deal more than we have the time or 
analytical overview to cover here. 
Instead we have outlined some of the most crucial challenges that Libya must face in the post-
Gaddafi era and onwards, taking point of departure in our investigation of Gaddafi’s regime and 
its legacy. 
  
As it has been pointed out in the analysis, Gaddafi’s regime was far from democratic, and a lot of 
speculation has been put into whether the uprising could have been the first step towards a 
democratization of Libya. The National Transitional Council, that was the formal leading 
representative body of the rebels, made it clear from the beginning that the autocratic nature of 
the old regime should be replaced with a regime based on democratic ideals. However, 
Promising ideals are by no means a guarantee for success. 
The fact that the vast majority of the ordinary citizens to one degree or another supported the 
uprising is an important stepping-stone towards further unity and endorsement of a democratic 
regime (Chivvis et al 2012: 2). Nonetheless, there are some major challenges related to a 
successful transition and democratization is an on-going process that will take many years to 
consolidate. As advocates of the path dependency school emphasize, the structures that 
surrounded the past regime will affect the new regime as well (Burnell 2011: 263). In the same 
way as Gaddafi used the legacy of the monarchy to strengthen his own position via what al-
Werfalli terms negative legitimacy, the new regime can take advantage of the legacy Gaddafi has 
left behind. But it is important to embrace democratization in a broader and more profound 
manner than just formal cosmetic change in order to prevent the old assumptions of how power 
should be generated to reappear (Ottaway 2008: 8). A step in the right direction towards real 
democratization would be a blossoming civil society, including political parties, unions and 
independent media, but it also requires a skilled civil service to administer and implement 
policies. (Chivvis et al 2012: 10). Formal institutions composed of individuals hired due to their 
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qualifications instead of their loyalty towards the leader could help as a push for transparency 
and form a break with the traditional patterns of determining policies via informal channels and 
personal ties. 
  
In continuation of establishing an efficient bureaucracy lies the task of developing a police force 
to maintain security, which is especially urgent in a post-war context, where weapons are still 
available and new conflicts can easily break out (Zoubir & Rózsa 2012: 1280). 
Maintaining security is also a decisive factor in keeping Libya as a cohesive nation-state. A long-
term strategy for national unity will likely imply a considerate respect for regional and tribal 
differences. Support from the tribes is needed to gain popular legitimacy, which is an essential 
premise for the new regime to efficiently move beyond the authoritarian structures of the 
Gaddafi-era (Zoubir & Rózsa 2012: 1278). 
  
Scholars have argued that rents from natural resources have been an obstacle for democratization 
and the accountability of the state (Schwarz 2004: 24, Schlumberger 2000: 110). The reason is 
that the revenues from rents ruin the government’s incentive to tax its citizens and thus create a 
symbiosis of reciprocal dependence. Consequently it would be advisable for Libya to impose 
taxes on its citizens in order to gain revenue from other sources, which would also be a small 
step towards a reduced fiscal vulnerability regarding the oil and gas prices. However to avoid 
unnecessary conflict, taxation should only be implemented gradually simultaneously with public 
education on why it is considered beneficial. Likewise the state of Libya could collect 
advantageous revenues by seeking to reduce subsidizing of national energy prices (Chivvis et al 
2012: 13). Higher prices leaning towards international markets would regulate overconsumption 
and could fund welfare to the broad population instead.  
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